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THE POLITICS OF FEAR: UNACCOMPANIED IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN AND THE CASE OF THE SOUTHERN BORDER
SARAH ROGERSON*
“No society, no state can successfully assume the tremendous responsi-
bility of fostering thousands of motherless, embittered, persecuted chil-
dren of undesirable foreigners and expect to convert these embattled
souls into loyal, loving American citizens . . . .  These children are sea-
soned veterans of a revolution of hate, are fertile fields for anarchy,
and as such are potential leaders of a revolt against
our American form of government.”1
INTRODUCTION
THE abuse and neglect of unaccompanied children2 claiming refugeestatus at the U.S.–Mexico border3 by the U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol and related immigration authorities have reignited legal scrutiny of
border practices.  Questions concerning the Constitutional and humanita-
rian floor of rights owed to unaccompanied children in immigration law
* Associate Professor of Law; Director, Law Clinic & Justice Center, Albany
Law School; L.L.M., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; J.D.,
M.A., Seton Hall University School of Law.  Many thanks to the 2015 Emerging
Immigration Scholars Conference, the Hofstra Law Spring 2016 Faculty Workshop
Series, Melissa Breger, Ray Brescia, Jason Cade, Akilah N. Folami, Joanna
Grossman, Peter Halewood, Keith Hirokawa, Kit Johnson, Dan Kanstroom,
Elizabeth Keyes, Theo Liebmann, and Christian Sundquist for comments
throughout the drafting stages, and to Laura Gulfo for her most excellent research
assistance as well as the Villanova Law Review staff for their diligent and thorough
edits.
1. Admission of German Refugee Children: Joint Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Immigration U.S. S. & a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion H.R. on S.J. Res. 64 & H.J. Res. 168, Joint Resolutions to Authorize the Admission into
the U.S. of a Limited Number of German Refugee Children, 76th Cong. 197–98 (1939)
(statement from Agnes Waters of far right-wing group of anti-Semite women who
opposed U.S. government’s decision to enter World War II, known as “the
Mothers’ Movement”).  For an in-depth portrait of Mrs. Waters and other leaders
of the Mothers’ Movement, see GLEN JEANSONNE, WOMEN OF THE FAR RIGHT: THE
MOTHERS’ MOVEMENT AND WORLD WAR II (1996).
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines an “unaccompanied alien
child” as:
[A] child who (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;
(B) has not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom – (i)
there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent
or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and
physical custody.
6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012).
3. See The US-Mexico Border, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2006), http://www
.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-mexico-border/ [https://perma.cc/2Q8P-F7NJ]
(“The border area in the United States consists of 48 counties in four states.”).
(843)
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that have long gone unanswered are now unavoidable as record numbers
of these children flee gang violence, civil unrest, exploitation, and ex-
treme poverty to seek a better life in the United States.  In just the first
quarter of the 2016 fiscal year, the rates of unaccompanied children mi-
grating to the United States have nearly doubled compared to the same
quarter last year, with some sectors along the border seeing more than five
times the number of children than they identified in 2015.4
The presence of these children has disrupted a border zone that has
developed from an unregulated wilderness to a militarized immigration
enforcement regime over the last century.5  Today there exists a zone
where “the law is operating . . . to protect the body politic from violations
of the nation’s borders and to repel individuals who are characterized,
oddly, as simultaneously so dependent as to be undesirable and so super-
humanly criminal as to require violent containment.”6  Unaccompanied
children bear the brunt of this uber-militant enforcement, exacerbating a
“paradoxical situation where those considered vulnerable and most in
need of protection, care, and compassion may end up being particularly
disadvantaged and discriminated against — objects of suspicion and fear
rather than subjects with rights to dignity and due process.”7
Human rights reports have detailed the abuses of unaccompanied
children by immigration officials at the U.S.–Mexico border and have de-
cried the absence of border patrol accountability.8  These abuses persist in
4. According to statistics published by U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
the regions seeing the largest increase include Yuma, Arizona (>500%), Big Bend,
Texas (296%), and El Paso, Texas (222%). See United States Border Patrol Southwest
Family Unit Subject & Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016,
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-
border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016 [https://perma.cc/A5HR-7XWY] (last
updated Oct. 18, 2016).
5. For further discussion on this point, see infra notes 158–87 and accompany-
ing text.
6. See Jennifer Chaco´n, Feminists at the Border, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 85, 96
(2014).
7. See Jacqueline Bhabha, “Not a Sack of Potatoes”: Moving and Removing Children
Across Borders, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 197, 212 (2006); see also Liz Robbins, A Para-
doxical Position on Youths Fleeing Violence, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/nyregion/a-paradoxical-position-on-youths-fleeing-vio-
lence.html [https://perma.cc/M6LW-C2LQ].
8. See, e.g., A Culture of Cruelty: Abuse and Impunity in Short-Term U.S. Border Pa-
trol Custody, NO MORE DEATHS 5, 25 (2011), http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/CultureOfCruelty-full.compressed.pdf [https://perma
.cc/DS4K-MSQU] (stating “[c]hildren were more likely than adults to be denied
water or given insufficient water,” that “physical abuse was reported by [ten] per-
cent of interviewees, including teens and children,” and “[r]ates of physical abuse
did not differ by gender or age . . . meaning that children were as likely to be
physically abused as adults”); Daniel E. Martı´nez et al., No Action Taken: Lack of CBP
Accountability in Responding to Complaints of Abuse, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 4–5 (May
2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/re
search/No%20Action%20Taken_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F4P-D3K7] (com-
piling statistics regarding CBP abuses against undocumented women, men, and
children “in all nine southwestern Border Patrol sectors between January 22, 2009
2
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spite of recent legal reforms designed specifically to afford certain consti-
tutional protections to children in immigration custody.9  In fact, through-
out history, nearly every advance that has been made to shelter children
from disproportionate enforcement policies that punish them as criminal
aliens upon arrival has been met with fear-based objections by groups op-
posing rights for these children, including local, state, and federal
governments.
The persistence of exclusionist policies and practices that circumvent
laws developed to protect the rights of children at the border is sympto-
matic of a long history in the United States of devaluing children’s rights
and fearing the unaccompanied immigrant child.  The subordination and
diminution of children’s rights in America, particularly those of immi-
grant children, is well-documented.10  And immigration law, like many
other bodies of American law, views children chiefly as dependents, not as
individuals bearing rights.11  The lack of child-centered laws and policies
is rooted in the western cultural underpinning of childhood as an experi-
ence of dependency12:
and January 5, 2012”); see also Letter from Ashley Huebner, Nat’l Immigrant Justice
Ctr., et al., to Megan H. Mack, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., & John Roth, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 11,
2014), available at http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/DHS%
20Complaint%20re%20CBP%20Abuse%20of%20UICs.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KZA2-B6W5] [hereinafter Letter from Nat’l Immigration Justice Ctr.]; Halfway
Home: Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Custody, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMIS-
SION 1, 9–11, https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/resources/download/
196 [https://perma.cc/A5JP-7G2S] (last updated Nov. 12, 2015).  For further dis-
cussion of the treatment unaccompanied immigrant children receive, see infra
notes 215–45 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 145–246 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
treatment unaccompanied immigrant children receive in immigration custody.
10. See generally Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80
MINN. L. REV. 267, 298 (1996) (documenting historical evolution of debate over
child rights and concluding that no child rights advocacy strategy has or could
succeed in United States without “summon[ing] attention and resources”); Hillary
Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487 (1973); see also David B.
Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-Centered Immigration
Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58, 68 (2006) (“Immigration law is systemically and
specifically designed to limit the role of children and the value placed on their
interests.”).
11. See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Chil-
dren’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 987 (2002) (stating
decision regarding how to treat children “need not be between an extreme posi-
tion of abandoning children to their rights and earlier paradigms in which chil-
dren’s vulnerabilities blocked recognition of them as rights holders”); see also,
Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and
Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 219–21
(2006) (discussing absence of agency and voice of children in creation of same
policies enforced against them).
12. See generally Susan Terrio et al., Voice, Agency and Vulnerability: The Immigra-
tion of Children Through Systems of Protection and Enforcement, 49 INT’L MIGRATION,
Oct. 2011, at 1, 1–2 (compiling articles that address impact of “Western ideologies”
on conceptions of children’s autonomy).
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As a result, children’s independence, autonomy, and actions are
often overlooked or, when recognized, discussed in negative
terms and as the result of adults’ failure to exercise responsibility
for children.  There are constant disruptions between boundaries
of meaning around what constitutes childhood, because children
exercising autonomy are often characterized by adults as
unchildlike.13
Rather than existing as persons with individual substantive and proce-
dural rights, children are subjected to the presumption that they lack self-
sufficiency and are therefore innately dependent; the conclusion is then
made that the establishment of laws and social institutions for their well-
being, rather than laws aimed at empowering them through the preserva-
tion of their individual rights, is inherently appropriate.14  As such, the
very notion that children hold rights independent from any adult or state
custodial connection challenges the foundational legal framework
through which the unaccompanied child’s experience is evaluated.  By de-
sign and default, state action targets unaccompanied children more often
than children who migrate with their parents because the state has no
legal obligation to care for accompanied children absent parental default
or delinquency.15  In contrast, children who present themselves at the bor-
der without a parent force the state to decide what individual rights and
freedoms to afford them, and to determine at what point those rights and
freedoms are triggered.
13. Stuart C. Aitken et al., Unaccompanied Migrant Children and Youth: Navigat-
ing Relational Borderlands, in CHILDREN & BORDERS 214, 232 (Spyros Spyrou & Mi-
randa Christou eds., 2014).
14. See Rodham, supra note 10, at 493 (locating value of dependency in laws
respecting children in United States, identifying appropriate boundaries of state
intervention in private life of children, and urging separation, where appropriate,
between rights of children and those of their parents); see also, M. Aryah Somers et
al., Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied Children in the Immigration System in
the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 311, 322–30 (2010) (describing
five different “constructions” of childhood, including “dependency construction,”
and how constructions operate within context of immigration removal hearings for
two undocumented immigrant children).
15. As will be discussed, this dependency preference is evident in immigration
laws and policies that privilege children who arrive with their families over unac-
companied children, as well as fear-based restrictions on the admission of unac-
companied children rooted in their dependency.  However, the dependency
preference is not strong enough to stay the removal of immigrant parents of U.S.-
citizen children. See Hamdi ex rel. Hamdi v. Napolitano, 620 F.3d 615, 620–29 (6th
Cir. 2010); Payne-Barahona v. Gonza´les, 474 F.3d 1, 2–4 (1st Cir. 2007); Acosta v.
Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Anaya, 14 I. & N. Dec. 488
(B.I.A. 1973).  Oddly, the converse is true for undocumented children.  Courts
have recognized the hardship resulting from their parents’ deportation on a very
limited theory of “constructive deportation” when the child is at risk of harm upon
return. See Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005)).  These are two anomalies
that fall outside the majority of examples that constitute the dependency
preference.
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In the absence of parents, the law strips children of the rights that
would default to them by parental cover and, assuming the role in loco
parentis, views their dependency fearfully.  Even nascent immigration laws
assume that children are absolutely and inherently dependent, while also
protecting the general public from myriad perceived dangers triggered by
their mere presence in the country.  History has shown that the govern-
ment is a stubbornly unsympathetic caretaker on this point.  The current
state of the law is that most existing immigration laws and policies, includ-
ing those applied at the borders while children are in the custody of the
federal government, do not contain or reflect fundamental legal standards
respecting the care and custody of children.  As many scholars have docu-
mented, largely absent from immigration law is the “best interests of the
child” standard, a central family law tenet in decisions respecting the
health, safety, and welfare of children.16
What has developed in place of best interests is a complex web of
legal hurdles that children must clear without any guarantee of legal rep-
resentation or even a legal chaperone to make the case for their protec-
tion under the law.  Historically documented in the exclusion and poor
detention conditions for the “undesirable minority” of children with devel-
opmental disabilities,17 this phenomenon has also been observed in a re-
cent mapping of academic empirical studies of migrant Mexican and
Central American children.  The studies noted two common observations
in the literature: (1) the lack of a best interest standard in the political and
legal institutions and processes that address unaccompanied children; and
(2) ”irregularities reported in the treatment of [ ] migrant children [by
16. One important mention of this standard occurs in the Special Immigrant
Juvenile eligibility requirements, discussed below.  But the standard has been
largely overlooked or actively excluded from the vast majority of immigration law
applicable to children.  In fact, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has expressly in-
structed Immigration Judges not to concern themselves with the “best interests”
standard. See Memorandum from David L. Neal, Chief Immigration Judge, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to All Immigration Judges, Court Adm’rs, Judicial Law Clerks, &
Immigration Court Staff 4 (May 22, 2007), available at https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2007/05/22/07-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF82-
ZHRR] (“The concept of ‘best interest of the child’ does not negate the statute or
the regulatory delegation of the Attorney General’s authority, and cannot provide
a basis for providing relief not sanctioned by law.”); see also Bridgette A. Carr, Incor-
porating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120 (2009); David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best
Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts,
11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45 (2005); Thronson, supra note 10, at 68 n.41 (“So
foreign to immigration law is the concept of ‘best interests of the child’ that in
these cases special factual findings with regard to the child’s interest are made not
in immigration proceedings but in a state juvenile court.” (citing 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J) (2006))); Erin B. Corcoran, Getting Kids out of Harm’s Way: The
United States’ Obligation to Operationalize the Best Interest of the Child Principle for Unac-
companied Minors, 47 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2014).
17. See Undesirable Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1911, at 12.
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officials] both in Mexico and the U.S.”18  The exclusion of child-centered
norms from immigration law and the resulting abuses in enforcement are
a result of the incursion of fear-based interference to the development
and successful implementation of child-centered laws and policies.
Fear, more than any other factor, has shaped immigration law, policy,
and enforcement against children, but current trends in litigation show
that fear-based oppositions are losing ground to humanitarian-focused, in-
dividual rights arguments in favor of protecting existing due process
rights.  This paper examines that shift.  Part I of this Article examines U.S.
immigration policies impacting unaccompanied children from Ellis Island
to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.19  This section examines the
relationship between dependency-based views of children and fear-based
objections to immigration laws impacting unaccompanied minors, con-
necting the experience of unaccompanied children at today’s
U.S.–Mexico border with its historical precedent.  Part II identifies the
rights that have been afforded to unaccompanied children at the border
through legislation and litigation in the last several decades, observing a
recent jurisprudential trend of identifying non-fear-based frameworks in
extending certain individual rights to unaccompanied minors.  Part III
continues with observations about pending litigation and advocacy efforts,
noting the resurrection of fear-based objections to due process rights for
unaccompanied minors and, for the first time, the explicit judicial rejec-
tion of those arguments.  Part IV suggests a legal framework rooted in the
recent jurisprudential shift away from the fear-based paradigm.  When ap-
plied to future laws, policies, and judicial decisions, this more constitution-
ally sound framework has the potential to interrupt history’s cycle of abuse
and neglect of unaccompanied minors, extending additional due process
protections for children and penalizing the government’s failure to guar-
antee established safeguards.
I. A HISTORY OF FEAR: AMERICA’S DISCOMFORT WITH THE DEPENDENCY OF
UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE CHILDREN
Fear has always played a central role in the development of laws and
policies to address unaccompanied immigrant children seeking admission
to the United States.  Examining the experience of unaccompanied chil-
dren within the broader context of America’s migration history reveals a
dramatic shift that is most easily observable at the U.S.–Mexico border:
over time, immigration enforcement against children moved from willful
blindness and deferral to parental authority to militaristic, quasi-criminal
punishment using laws designed to curb unauthorized migration of
18. See Lilian Chavez & Cecilia Menjı´var, Children Without Borders: A Mapping of
the Literature on Unaccompanied Migrant Children to the United States, 5 MIGRACIONES
INTERNACIONALES 71, 96–101 (2010) (identifying mistreatments such as violations
of privacy, prolonged detention, and placement of children in prison-like settings
without access to legal representation).
19. See Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
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adults.20  A close examination of the history of immigration enforcement
against unaccompanied immigrant children, and the fears throughout his-
tory that served as the normative impetus to enact them, informs the rela-
tively rapid militarization and move toward strict enforcement at the
border.  Observing this shift illustrates the political and practical implica-
tions of the relationship between dependency and fear in immigration law
and policy affecting unaccompanied immigrant children.
A. The Four Fears
In debates involving any new immigration proposal or policy regard-
ing unaccompanied minors, opponents reliably voice certain arguments in
opposition to the proposed reform, which can be categorized into four
different fear-based myths: (1) the Fear of Economic Dependency, (2) the
Fear of Floodgates, (3) the Fear of Ideological Invasion, and (4) the Fear
of “the Immigrant Other.”21  The first two are rooted in the dependency
norm, and the second two are extensions of nationalist arguments chal-
lenging progressive and inclusive immigration movements.
1. The Fear of Economic Dependency
Voiced as early as the very first immigration reforms targeted specifi-
cally at unaccompanied children, the fear of economic disadvantage has
taken many different forms, all rooted in an idea of children depending
on the economic system, rather than contributing to it.  For some, the fear
is that the children will become dependents on the state foster care sys-
tem, which is expensive and requires the diversion of financial resources
to their care.22  Others express a fear that unaccompanied children will
flood the job market and compete with their children for jobs and educa-
tional opportunities.  However, recent reports have shown that, rather
than becoming dependent on the job market, immigrants contribute a
substantial amount of capital and growth to our economy.23  Related to
20. See Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The Treat-
ment of Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 252 (2010) (“The overarching obstacle to proper treatment
for unaccompanied children is an immigration system that was never designed
[to] take children into account.  For the most part, these immigration programs
continue to treat immigrant children and adults identically under U.S. law.”).
21. See Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the
Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations, 89 IND. L.J. 643 (2014) (coining term “Im-
migrant ‘Other,’” specifically in context of immigrant children).
22. Note, however, that this fear has also been used to advocate for reforms
that favor unaccompanied children in the child welfare and family justice systems.
Some justify both family unity- and child-centered reforms that would prevent un-
accompanied minors from being placed in the child welfare system.
23. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli:
New York City’s Immigrant Population Playing Increased Role in Economy (Nov.
5, 2015), available at http://osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/nov15/110515.htm
[https://perma.cc/W795-TXMD] (“Immigrants accounted for $257 billion in eco-
nomic activity in New York City in 2013, nearly one-third of the city’s total eco-
7
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this fear is the false assumption that the children who enter from abroad
will have the same training, education, and job-preparedness skills as a
child born in the United States.
Finally, a fear rooted in an assumed dependency of unaccompanied
children on the state is that they will divert resources that should be com-
mitted to assisting underprivileged children in the United States.24  How-
ever, the systems and processes involved in assisting, for example,
homeless children in the United States are completely different than the
systems and processes involved in resettling unaccompanied minors—they
come from completely different budgets.  This fear assumes that there is a
trade-off, dollar for dollar, between these two budgets as if they are com-
peting, which stems from a misunderstanding of the federal budgetary
process.  It also assumes that these children will all either become depen-
dent on the state, require state resources, or both.  This assumption is
problematic vis-a`-vis the most recently arrived children: (1) many unac-
companied children from Central America are joining family members in
the United States, who then support them25; and (2) some children are of
working age and support themselves either partly or completely by
working.
2. The Fear of Floodgates
Rooted in the idea that children are dependent on either their family
members or the state, or both, is the fear that establishing systems and
processes to resettle unaccompanied child refugees will open the flood-
gates to additional migrants, including the parents of children who seek
refuge.  This particular fear has given rise to a false metaphor of migrant
children as an anchor securing a virtual ship of myriad foreign adult rela-
tives within the territory of the United States.  As manifested in the term
“anchor baby,” which has gained popular appeal in anti-immigrant, anti-
birthright citizenship parlance, children are objectified as physical repre-
sentations of a corresponding legal fallacy—that they “exert their infant
political heft to pull others into the country.”26
In other iterations, this fear is expressed as one that will result in a
massive influx of children who are incentivized to come to the United
States for reasons that are not necessarily related to the humanitarian cri-
sis.  A last floodgate fear is that other countries will notice the United
nomic output and nearly twice the level in 2000 . . . .” (citing November 2015
report by N.Y. State Comptroller)).
24. For a further discussion on this point, see infra notes 21–33 and accompa-
nying text.
25. See A Guide to Children Arriving at the Border: Laws, Policies and Responses, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL 2 (June 26, 2015), http://immigrationpolicy.org/special-re-
ports/guide-children-arriving-border-laws-policies-and-responses [https://perma
.cc/3LJ2-GD4U] [hereinafter A Guide to Children Arriving at the Border] (listing
“family reunification” as one factor contributing to migration).
26. See Rachel Ida Buff, Toward a Redefinition of Citizenship Rights, in IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS IN THE SHADOWS OF CITIZENSHIP 10 (Rachel Ida Buff ed., 2008).
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States’ admission of these children at its borders and send their children
to live here, too.  These fears are objectively refutable.  Given the reasons
children are articulating for why they are fleeing, their migration is specifi-
cally connected to the humanitarian crises in the countries that they are
fleeing, and, for many of them, they already have a parent here with status
but not the ability to petition for their children to join them.  This is a
function of a uniquely humanitarian floodgate control that is already em-
bedded in U.S. immigration law and policy.
Out of the four main countries from which we are seeing these chil-
dren, two of them—El Salvador and Honduras—have been provided spe-
cial immigration relief by the U.S. government called “Temporary
Protected Status” (TPS).  TPS permits individuals who have already arrived
and cannot “return[ ] safely” due to civil war, “environmental disaster,” or
“[o]ther extraordinary and temporary conditions” to stay in the United
States.27  This form of relief is available only to individuals present in the
United States when the TPS designation occurred.  The relief mimics the
international refugee principle of “non-refoulement,” which prohibits
countries from returning individuals to their countries of origin or “any
country in which [the individuals] might be subject to persecution” on
account of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.”28  TPS extends similar protections and in-
cludes a right to work in the United States, which is uncommon among
humanitarian forms of relief (including asylum status), for individuals
fleeing certain wars and disasters.
For some of the children who flee, their parents or a parent has been
provided TPS status, while the rest of the family remains.  Because the
protection is intended to be temporary, it does not afford individuals the
right to bring their families to join them unless they can otherwise adjust
their status to lawful permanent residency or become naturalized citizens.
In November 2014, the State Department enacted a program that would
allow for in-country processing of children from El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala to join their lawfully-present parents in the United
27. Individuals from both El Salvador and Honduras are currently in a state of
prolonged TPS eligibility, which has been extended from March 9, 2001, until Sep-
tember 9, 2016, and from January 5, 1999, until July 5, 2016, respectively. See Tem-
porary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc/7J2B-Z8LZ] (last up-
dated Oct. 26, 2016).  Mexico and Guatemala are the other two countries of origin
for the vast majority of unaccompanied minors seeking entry at the southern
border.
28. See Refoulement, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migra
tion/glossary/refoulement/ [https://perma.cc/NVW7-QMGG] (last visited Oct.
7, 2016) (citing Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES 30, http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees
.html [https://perma.cc/TM96-3ZLF] (last visited Oct. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Con-
vention and Protocol]).
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States,29 but the program is onerous and has well-documented limitations
that have inhibited its success.30
The U.S. government must verify that conditions in any country to
which TPS has been extended are so intolerable that people should not
have to return.  All of the reasons that children from these countries artic-
ulate for fleeing are a function of the permanent, systemic threats that
have persisted from a temporary socioeconomic or political disturbance.31
In fact, there is a movement underway by over 270 organizations and an
equally impressive number of law professors to re-designate El Salvador
and Honduras for continued TPS protections and extend TPS protections
to nationals from Guatemala.  Children in all three countries, which com-
prise the “Northern Triangle,” flee due to continued unrest.32  The argu-
ment is that if the conditions are bad enough for individuals here to
remain, the same humanitarian justifications should allow those individu-
als’ children to join them or to allow children who have no one to protect
them to seek refuge in the United States.  The floodgate control mecha-
29. See In-Country Refugee/Parole Program for Minors in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras with Parents Lawfully Present in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2014/234067
.htm [https://perma.cc/MXW9-D7NV].
30. Through in-country processing, parents lawfully present in the United
States may file to bring their unmarried children who are under the age of twenty-
one living in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to join them in this country.
“As of August 2015, parents have submitted nearly 3,000 applications and children
are being interviewed to determine their eligibility.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 i, iv (Oct.
1, 2015), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/247982.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JH6A-CCTH]. Through this proposal, the Obama administra-
tion established the Central American Minors (CAM) Refugee Parole Program.
See Faye Hipsman & Doris Meissner, In-Country Refugee Processing in Central America:
A Piece of the Puzzle, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 1 (Aug. 2015), http://www.migra-
tionpolicy.org/research/country-processing-central-america-piece-puzzle [https://
perma.cc/3CQY-XQTD]. The outlook on this program is still unclear:
CAM may provide an alternative to dangerous journeys for some unac-
companied children, but it is not likely to do so at a scale that can signifi-
cantly reduce child migrant flows to the United States at this time . . . .
Overall, in-country programs have helped and can help many people.
But they have inherent limitations that make them inadequate—as stand-
alone programs—to counteract dire humanitarian circumstances.
Id. at 2.
31. See A Guide to Children Arriving at the Border, supra note 25, at 1–3 (detailing
reasons children are fleeing to United States from Northern Triangle).
32. See Letter from Access Living et al., to President Barack Obama 1 (Jan. 25,
2016), available at http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
images/Northern-Triangle-TPS-National-Letter-January-25-2016.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/WJ83-W6PA] (requesting TPS designation of Northern Triangle); Letter
from Erin B. Corcoran, et al., to President Barack Obama 1 (Feb. 26, 2016), availa-
ble at http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/2016_02_26_
ProfessorTPSLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D3H-CLSD] (“We urge that that
the . . . countries of[ ] El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras . . . [are designated]
for Temporary Protected Status . . . .”).
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nism is built into the fact that the executive branch of the U.S. Govern-
ment has absolute control over the TPS designation and period of
duration.
3. The Fear of Ideological Invasion
A fear that has been articulated from the earliest recorded American
conversations about immigration of unaccompanied children is the fear
that these children will bring an unwanted ideology and proselytize what
they see as an otherwise homogenous “American” public to the country’s
detriment.  In other articulations, it is the fear that unaccompanied chil-
dren are radicalized and will commit acts of terror or gang violence in the
United States once admitted.  Major assumptions inherent in this fear in-
clude perceptions of America as culturally and ideologically homogenous,
unaccompanied children as homogenous and dogmatic in their ideolo-
gies, and these children even possessing such ideologies to begin with.
With the country’s earliest immigration policies now over a century
old, data reveal that the opposite is actually more likely: immigrant chil-
dren integrate much more quickly than adults, and, even more powerful
than spouses, children encourage the integration of American culture and
values in their families.  As Kerry Abrams notes:
In all of these scenarios, children may be a much more important
factor in integration than spouses.  It is commonly argued that
parents help to integrate their children . . . .  But often, it hap-
pens the other way around.  Children attend school and partici-
pate in extracurricular activities at a time in their lives when they
are rapidly developing, emotionally and intellectually.  Their loy-
alties, preferences, and understanding of their place in the world
will be largely shaped by their experiences with peers.  Although
their parents may be able to resist acculturation, doing so will be
difficult for their children.  Children bring American culture
home to their parents.33
As will be evident in the rest of this section, this fear has been refuted
far more often than it has been reinforced, even anecdotally.34  The idea
33. Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 19
(2013) (footnotes omitted). But see William Booth, One Nation, Indivisible: Is It His-
tory?, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/meltingpot/melt0222.htm [https://perma.cc/
WB2N-6VKU] (challenging assumptions regarding assimilation and identifying
groups of immigrants, including children, who prefer not to self-identify as Ameri-
can and wish to retain culture and identity in “twilight of common dreams”).
34. For example, at least one study concluded that the legalization of millions
of immigrants under the Reagan amnesty of the mid-1980s resulted in a decrease
in crime rates, contrary to the persistent fear that immigrants import crime. See
Scott R. Baker, Effects of Immigrant Legalization on Crime, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 210,
210–13 (2015) (providing empirical data on crime reduction and linking reduc-
tion with amnesty).
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of integration is difficult to define and even more difficult to measure, but
history is rife with the false alarms raised by those who hold this fear.  Its
persistence, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, speaks to how
deeply it is felt by a significant portion of the American population.
4. The Fear of “the Immigrant Other”
The earliest immigration policies in our country were specifically
aimed at keeping certain groups of individuals out of the United States.
The first two pieces of legislation restricting immigration to the United
States were race based, “targeting Chinese women” as well as Chinese la-
borers.35  The second of the two, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,36
“was the first [immigration law] that explicitly made race an exclusionary
factor and one that escaped equal protection review”37 when it was upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United States.38  Today, the
fear of the immigrant other continues to manifest itself systemically and
overtly—for example, the disproportionate rate at which immigrant par-
ents’ rights are infringed upon or terminated in the family justice system39
and the exclusionist rhetoric and proposed policies of President-Elect
Donald Trump.40  This fear capitalizes on constructions of race and the
35. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 692–95 (2005) (noting Congressional approval of
1875 Page Act and law’s focus on Chinese women).  At the time, Chinese women
who immigrated to the United States were widely viewed as “prostitutes . . . second
wives or concubines establishing a system of polygamy contrary to the American
model of monogamous marriage.” See id. at 693.
36. Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58.
37. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Chae Chan Ping v. United States: Immigration as
Property, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 137, 151 (2015).
38. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
39. See Maddali, supra note 21, at 646 (connecting termination of parental
rights in immigrant families to historical precedent of removing Native American
children from their families “in an attempt to cultivate an Anglo-American na-
tional identity”); Sarah Rogerson, Lack of Detained Parents’ Access to the Family Justice
System and the Unjust Severance of the Parent-Child Relationship, 47 FAM. L.Q. 141, 157
(2013) (“[T]he parental rights of fit but unauthorized parents could be termi-
nated in the name of the best interests of the state . . . .”); Sarah Rogerson, Unin-
tended and Unavoidable: The Failure to Protect Rule and Its Consequences for
Undocumented Parents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 580, 582–83 (2012) (cit-
ing In re Victoria L., 950 A.2d 1168 (R.I. 2008)) (noting relative ease with which
courts infringe on parental rights of unauthorized mothers).
40. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican
Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-con
necting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/D766-
CM8F] (scrutinizing Donald Trump’s comments regarding Mexican immigrants
with facts refuting assertion that immigrants and crime rates are directly propor-
tional); see also Immigration, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, https://www.donaldj-
trump.com/policies/immigration/ [https://perma.cc/8UUP-PPBN] (last visited
Nov. 20, 2016).
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corresponding imagined threat to whiteness in America.41  As each wave
of new Americans arrives, this fear is invoked for both political and self-
interested reasons, but has never been empirically supported.
B. The Earliest Immigration Laws Regarding Unaccompanied Minors
Arriving by Sea
Prior to the establishment of the U.S. Government, orphan children
and those who were otherwise separated from their parents were sent to
the colonies in large numbers to serve “in homes as apprentices or inden-
tured servants.”42  “In England as well as the American colonies, children
had no legal say in whether they were placed out.”43  This earliest recep-
tion of what would today be considered unaccompanied immigrant chil-
dren anchors the American history of children in dependency and state
control.
The earliest U.S. immigration laws on record date back to the late-
eighteenth century and focus almost entirely on three things: (1) regulat-
ing vessels transporting immigrants to the water ports of entry in the
United States, (2) the naturalization process, and (3) establishing the
right of the federal government to exclude certain individuals from the
country on the basis of national security.44  With some exceptions, these
three main issues would dominate immigration law and policy in the
United States.  Restrictions on the immigration of unaccompanied chil-
dren were minimal, focusing mainly on health and safety, and not explic-
itly relating to race-based classifications.  The first immigration law
addressing immigrant children without parents was an 1824 amendment
to the naturalization process, which allowed unaccompanied children
under the age of twenty-one to naturalize “as long as he or she had resided
within the United States for five years or more,” counting the years since
41. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural
Nation: The Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347,
1378 (2005) (providing critical review of SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?
THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004)).  Johnson and Hing
note that Who Are We? offers thinly-veiled racially-based fears regarding migration
of Latinos and state that Huntington “fears the challenge to his Anglo-Protestant,
English-language vision of American identity.” See id.
42. See Rebecca S. Trammell, Orphan Train Myths and Legal Reality, 5 MOD.
AM., Fall 2009, at 3 (citing HOMER FOLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED, AND
DELINQUENT CHILDREN 3–4 (1902)) (“Records indicate that as early as 1627, Vir-
ginia-bound English ships carried between 1400 and 1500 children across the At-
lantic and into child labor apprenticeship in the colonies.” (citing 1 ARTHUR W.
CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
PRESENT 306–07 (1917))).
43. Id.
44. See Henry B. Hazard, The Immigration and Nationality Systems of the United
States of America, 14 F.R.D. 105, 107–14 (1954) (detailing early immigration history
of United States and noting Alien and Sedition statute of 1798 “gave the President
power to expel aliens dangerous to the United States”).
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the child’s arrival.45  Although this law was aimed at children who had
already arrived, it was the first to establish an alienage right for a child
independent of his or her parents.
The next law specific to unaccompanied children, passed over eighty
years later, was the 1907 Exclusionary Act, which expanded the categories
of excluded persons to include unaccompanied children under the age of
sixteen.46  As documented by librarian and historian Barry Moreno, this
restriction had a gendered impact because girls and women were required
to have a male escort into the country, unlike “boys [sixteen] and older
and all men [who] were generally admissible on their own account.”47
“The unfairness of this policy was upheld on grounds that females needed
special safeguards to protect them from the dangers of immorality and
white slavery.  These threats were real, and . . . alarmed the public.”48
Aside from this gendered fear and assumption of dependency, Ellis Island
also ran a state-sponsored program—a collaboration of faith-based organi-
zations and social service organizations—to care for orphans, stowaways,
adventure-seekers, and other unaccompanied minors until they could be
found a home inside the United States or deported.49
Despite the increasingly restrictive exclusion of unaccompanied mi-
nors, approximately 3.4 million children immigrated to the United States
between 1892 and 1954.50  Child immigration peaked at 158,621 children
in 1914, seven years after Ellis Island began to implement its rule prohibit-
ing unaccompanied children from entering without one or both par-
ents.51  A 1915 New York Times article provides anecdotal evidence of the
strict enforcement of this law, telling the story of one English child,
Thorold Avery, who was chaperoned, first class, to join his parents in
America, but was nonetheless taken into custody by immigration officials
because he did not arrive with either of them.52  Another article that ran
around the same time told the story of Josefina Chinchilla and her brother
45. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 22 (Michael C. LeMay & Elliott Robert Barkan eds., 1999) (citing 934 Stat.
603).  Notably, the law itself did not refer to “unaccompanied children,” but was
specifically aimed at children who were naturalizing without their parents.
46. See id. at 109 (“The 1907 act increased the head tax to $4 and added to the
excludable classes imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, persons with physical or
mental defects which might affect their ability to earn a living, children unaccom-
panied by their parents, persons who admitted the commission of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude, and women coming to the United States for immoral
purposes.” (citing 34 Stat. 898)).
47. See BARRY MORENO, CHILDREN OF ELLIS ISLAND 7 (2005).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 8 (“The arrangement to bring over orphans was usually made by
charity workers, missionaries, and immigrant aid societies.”).
50. See id. at 125.
51. See id.
52. See id. (publication page) (citing Ellis Island Holds Boy of First Cabin, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1915, at 20).
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Enrico, from Bogota, Colombia.53  Josefina and Enrico were detained at
Ellis Island having arrived with their aunt after the death of their father to
seek an education in America with their cousins.54  Despite their aunt hav-
ing arranged for a male escort (her brother) as required by law for the
party, and despite her producing “$4,000 [ ] in gold,” they were at risk of
deportation because both Josefina and Enrico “were under 16.”55
Unaccompanied minors were explicitly excluded again in 1910 and
1917.  The 1917 Act extended a literacy test to children over sixteen and
added a provision that gave the Secretary of Labor the sole discretion to
admit children who were eligible and who he determined were “not likely
to become a public charge.”56  One historian marked the literacy tests in
the 1917 Act as “a definite move from regulation to attempted restric-
tion.”57  Additional provisions served as a “declaration of a white immigra-
tion policy” and “the strongly restrictionist and antialien temper of
Congress at the time.”58  The additional discretion afforded to the Secre-
tary of Labor also speaks to the growing fear of the potential dependencies
of these children.  The exclusion against unaccompanied immigrant chil-
dren, including the literacy exclusion, “remained unchanged until it was
dropped by the 1952 Act.”59
These policies toward unaccompanied minors also reflected the ten-
sions of competing, progressive-era child welfare movements for depen-
dent children and fear-based nationalist sentiments.  Defenders of child
labor rights and social reformers were very vocal in their support of unac-
companied immigrant children, regularly rebutting nationalist sentiments
that the southern and eastern Europeans arriving were racially inferior to
the prior wave of northern European migrants.60  The formation of these
laws was likely also informed by well-intentioned “child saver” policies,
which originally focused on non-institutional early interventions and edu-
cation for children identified as poor or at-risk, including the establish-
53. See id. at 32 (citing Children on Ellis Island: Boy and Girl Held for Lack of Legal
Guardianship, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1915, at 21).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY 1798–1965 438 (1981); LeMay & Barkan, supra note 45, at 110 (citing 39
Stat. 874).
57. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 56, at 167.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 438.
60. For example, pragmatic feminist and social reformer Jane Addams’s es-
tablishment of the Immigrants’ Protective League of Chicago urged open-border
policies and the education and assimilation of all immigrant children.  The organi-
zation sponsored many individual private bills in an attempt to prevent the wrong-
ful deportation of many immigrants, including children. See generally Henry B.
Leonard, The Immigrants’ Protective League of Chicago 1908–1921, 66 J. ILL. STATE
HIST. SOC’Y 271 (1973).
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ment of specialized juvenile courts.61  Unfortunately, many of these
programs had an adverse impact on immigrant children and families.
One such program was the “Orphan Train” program, which resettled
200,000 children, some of whom were not actually orphans but were none-
theless removed from their Catholic parents to be resettled with preferred
Protestant families in the West.62  Some historians have also viewed the
establishment of juvenile courts as a way for the white middle class to as-
sert its values and ideas of “proper [ ] methods of child rearing” on immi-
grant children and parents out of a “fear that if something were not done
about the unruly behavior of slum children, social order might be under-
mined.”63  This early history illustrates that lawmakers and even some
child welfare advocates of the time viewed unaccompanied immigrant chil-
dren as racially inferior, dependent, needy, and poor future criminals.
C. 1920s to 1950s: The Beginning of a Border Policy
In contrast to the development of early immigration laws, which
largely contemplated the arrival of immigrants at water-based ports, immi-
gration law and policy at the U.S.–Mexico land border developed later in
time.  According to researchers at the National Archives, there are no sta-
tistics of land border crossings at the Mexican border prior to 1906.64  Un-
til Congress enacted the Labor Appropriations Act in 1924 and formally
established the Customs and Border Patrol, the U.S.–Mexico border was
informally policed by immigration officers on horseback.65  Notably, it was
an exclusionary agenda, the need to enforce newly-legislated numerical
limitations on the migration of large numbers of unauthorized European
migrants entering via Mexico, which led to the establishment of the Cus-
61. See DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DELINQUENCY,
PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 45–77 (6th ed. 2010) (explaining child savers and child-
saving movement organized efforts during early 1800s to provide assistance to way-
ward youths, including food and shelter).
62. See Trammell, supra note 42, at 3; see also Maddali, supra note 21, at 666–67
(situating history of orphan trains within broader discussion of relationship be-
tween early immigration and national identity).
63. See ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS
AND THE RISE OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA AMERICA 205 (1998).
64. See NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., A3396: Index to Manifests of Perma-
nent and Statistical Alien Arrivals at El Paso, Texas, July 1924–July 1952  1 (comp. by
Claire Prechtel-Kluskens 2004), https://www.archives.gov/files/research/micro-
film/a3396.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD3L-V35U] (noting records of arrivals from
Mexico were not kept until 1906).
65. See MAI M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA, at 64–68 (2004) (discussing creation of Border Patrol and not-
ing that, previously, “[t]he Chinese patrol inspector, assigned to horseback de-
tail . . . occupied the loneliest and bottommost position in the hierarchy of the
service”); see also KELLY LYTLE HERNA´NDEZ, MIGRA! A HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER
PATROL, 32–36 (2010) (documenting history of Border Patrol and noting that its
“beginnings were inauspicious”).  “The [original] appropriation comprised less
than 25 percent of the Immigration Bureau’s total budget of $4,084,865 for that
year.”  Id. at 32.
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toms and Border Patrol.66  At the same time, the 1924 Act specifically ex-
empted “unmarried children under eighteen years of age” from the limits
of immigration quotas.67  On its face, this appears to be favorable for un-
accompanied minors; however, the exclusion of unaccompanied children
from the 1917 Act remained in place, so the quota exemption benefited
families over unaccompanied children.
During this time period, the fear of the immigrant other was gaining
momentum, and therefore, immigration policies at the border developed
much more rapidly from an unregulated zone of free movement to a heav-
ily restricted area in which immigration enforcement mechanisms were
exceptionally restrictive, racially discriminatory, and harsh.68  From its
very beginning, immigration policy at the U.S.–Mexico border mirrored
the rising anti-immigrant sentiment of the time and was driven by fears
regarding the relative (un)desirability of newcomers.  Inspection proce-
dures at nascent border checkpoints “involved a degrading procedure of
bathing, delousing, medical-line inspection, and interrogation.”69  Inspec-
tions did not involve, however, the collection of relevant identification and
biographical data.  It is therefore impossible to know how many unaccom-
panied children were migrating through the land borders without detec-
tion.  However, it is easy to imagine that they may have, and, for reasons
that will be detailed, mid-century accounts of Border Patrol agents support
a hypothesis that unaccompanied minors were largely left alone, even
when detected by Border Patrol, despite their statutorily-mandated
exclusion.70
1. The Wagner-Rogers Bill of 1939 and the Truman Directive
Evidence of attitudes of undesirability, exclusion, and xenophobia
against unaccompanied children can be found in the congressional de-
bates regarding the very first piece of immigration legislation solely relat-
ing to unaccompanied minors: the Wagner-Rogers Bill of 1939.  If passed,
the bill would have made 10,000 immigrant visas available for children
under the age of fourteen who resided in German territory.  Historian
Glen Jeansonne recounts the history of the bill as follows:
66. See NGAI, supra note 65, at 66 (“The most heavily traveled route for illegal
European immigration was through Mexico.”).
67. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 56, at 194 (citing Act of May 29, 1928, 45 Stat.
1009); see also NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., supra note 64, at 3.
68. For an extensive and detailed historical comparison and analysis of the
migration policy at the southern border and elsewhere in the United States, see
NGAI, supra note 65, at 64–90 (“Before the 1920s the Immigration Service paid
little attention to the nation’s land borders because the overwhelming majority of
immigrants entering the United States landed at Ellis Island and other seaports.”).
69. See id. at 68.
70. For a further discussion on this point, see infra notes 77–100 and accom-
panying text.
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On January 9 a delegation of clergymen presented a petition to
Roosevelt, asking him to open the doors of the United States to
the children.  Sen. Robert F. Wagner of New York and Congress-
man Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts introduced the Wag-
ner-Rogers Bill, or Child Refugee Bill, providing that a maximum
of ten thousand children under the age of fourteen be admitted
in 1939, and an additional ten thousand be admitted in 1940,
apart from the German quota for those years.  They would be
adopted temporarily by American families, with costs assumed by
individuals and private organizations.  The children would not be
permitted to work—a provision designed to mollify labor un-
ions—and would return to their parents when conditions in Eu-
rope were safe . . . . The day after the plan was announced, four
thousand families offered to adopt children.71
A number of influential groups rose in opposition, including a collec-
tion of far-right wing women’s groups, called “The Mothers’ Movement,”
who opposed the United States’s participation in World War II on anti-
Semitic and nationalist grounds.  The bill failed and “some twenty thou-
sand children were left to their fates in Nazi-occupied countries.”72  The
exclusion of unaccompanied children continued until President Truman
issued a directive in 1946 providing war orphans “immediate considera-
tion for admittance to the United States.”73  The so-called “Truman Direc-
tive” remained in effect until the Displaced Persons Act was passed in
1948,74 allowing for the “admission of three thousand nonquota orphans”
under the age of sixteen.75
Absent any comprehensive legislation addressing unaccompanied
children or refugees, this humanitarian gesture from the President was the
first of what would be many ad hoc executive directives aimed at unaccom-
panied children fleeing their home countries.  In the statement that ac-
companied the Truman Directive, President Truman acknowledged the
need to ensure that these children would not become dependent on the
state, but vouched for existing child welfare systems in place to secure that
guarantee.76  Valuing human rights over fear and exclusion, the President
71. JEANSONNE, supra note 1, 143–44.
72. See id. at 144 (citing ARTHUR D. MORSE, WHILE SIX MILLION DIED: A
CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN APATHY 268 (1983)). Wagner “withdrew the bill” after an
amendment was added that would have “count[ed] the twenty thousand children
against the quota.” See id.
73. See BETH B. COHEN, CASE CLOSED: HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 96 (2007) (noting Truman Directive aided Jewish minors entering United
States “from 1946 until July 1948”).
74. See Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009.
75. See COHEN, supra note 73, at 96 (“Those between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-one received affidavits from the U.S. Committee to enter on the regular
quota.”).
76. See Pres. Harry S. Truman, Statement and Directive by the President on
Immigration to the United States of Certain Displaced Persons and Refugees in
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urged “[t]his period of unspeakable human distress is not the time for us
to close or to narrow our gates.”77  President Truman’s statement marked
the first explicit executive rejection of fear-based objections to the admis-
sion of unaccompanied children.  However, as history unfolded post-
WWII, fears continued to hold back meaningful progress for future
groups of children seeking protection.
A. 1952 to 1980: The “Dependency Preference” and Ad Hoc Unaccompanied
Minor Admission Programs
As larger-scale border policies developed through the mid-century,
the focus on “territoriality and border control” of the post-War era contin-
ued to have a racializing effect at the border, where the discretion of Bor-
der Patrol agents trumped the statutory reform efforts that would follow.78
Terms used by Border Patrol agents to refer to unauthorized migrants
shifted from “deportable alien” to “criminal alien” and “border violator,”
which indicated a shift from “migration control” to “crime control.”79
Over time, Border Patrol’s mission crept from civil regulation to criminal
enforcement fairly easily, unchecked by any form of judicial review or dis-
cretionary guidance.80  Despite the passage of the first major piece of im-
migration legislation in the country’s history, the McCarran-Walter Act of
1952, which removed race-based quotas and eliminated the outright exclu-
sion of unaccompanied children, Congress continued to privilege chil-
dren arriving with parents or children who were immigrating to join their
adoptive families.81
Europe (Dec. 22, 1945), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=122
53 [https://perma.cc/5DPT-55YT] (“I am informed that no persons admitted
under their sponsorship have ever become charges on their communities.”).  As
reported from the field of the welfare groups who received these children:
We find the struggle between dependence and independence going on at
full force.  As one would expect, they seek love and acceptance but are
ambivalent about taking it.  They carry into their relationships the pat-
tern of competition and drive for survival which has characterized so im-
portant a part of their formative years.
COHEN, supra note 73, at 97 (quoting Deborah Portnoy, The Adolescent Immigrant,
JEWISH SOC. SERVICE Q., Sept. 1948, at 268, 269).  This historical account is no less
accurate a description of the struggles of unaccompanied immigrant children to-
day.  It would be many more years before this duality of dependence or resiliency
was even hinted at in immigration law and policy.
77. See Truman, supra note 76.
78. See NGAI, supra note 65, at 90.
79. See HERNA´NDEZ, supra note 65, at 206 (noting Border Patrol “disseminated
the new terminology to the general public”).
80. See AVIVA CHOMSKY, UNDOCUMENTED: HOW IMMIGRATION BECAME ILLEGAL
(2014); HERNA´NDEZ, supra note 65, at 206.
81. See generally HUTCHINSON, supra note 56, at 273–379.
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1. Laissez-Faire Border Policies and the End of Administrative Oversight
As noted earlier, there is a dearth of historical statistical information
regarding unauthorized immigrant children at the border generally,
which border historian Kelly Lytle Herna´ndez attributes to early gendered
Border Patrol quota policies that favored the deportation of single men
over women, children, and families.82  In fact, women and children were
often simply released from Border Patrol custody early in its history be-
cause they were ineligible for a government-sponsored program targeted
at regulating the migration of male Mexican laborers.83  During this so-
called “Bracero Era” of the 1940s and 1950s, “millions of husbands, sons,
brothers, and fathers were lifted into legal streams of migration, while wo-
men, children, and families were left to cross the border without sanc-
tion.”84  Immigrant children were, from time to time, “loaned” to single,
male workers in their efforts to present an appearance of family to avoid
deportation.85  Rather than being an independent subject of the policies,
children were either passively transported with their families or actively
used by other unauthorized adults to avoid border restrictions.  Unaccom-
panied minors were largely unaccounted for, and there is little statistical
information regarding their migration at the time.86  However, the anec-
dotal accounts captured by history reveal the beginnings of a laissez-faire
attitude towards unaccompanied children—inspired not by policy, but
through the combination of civil disobedience and impotent
enforcement.
Border Patrol officers of the time reported that children were simply
too difficult to capture at the border.  “In the public places where appre-
hension quite often occurred, the ‘shrieking’ and ‘struggling’ of children
who had been grabbed by Border Patrol officers often forced the ‘embar-
82. See HERNA´NDEZ, supra note 65, at 33 n.78, 135–36 (describing historical
data regarding unauthorized, unaccompanied immigrant children).
83. See id. at 135–36.
84. See id. at 135.
85. See id. at 136 (citing reports from Patrol Inspectors).
86. This author has not reviewed the microfilm of the land border manifests
available in the National Archives.  However, based on the description of what sta-
tistical data was recorded at the time, it appears that most migrants arriving from
the Western Hemisphere were largely omitted from the statistical data collected.
See generally Mexican Border Crossing Records, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives
.gov/research/immigration/border-mexico.html#howwhy [https://perma.cc/
322T-ZBM7] (last updated Apr. 4, 2011).  According to the records:
Statistical arrivals were immigrants or nonimmigrants who were subject to
the head tax and generally not from the Western Hemisphere.  By con-
trast, nonstatistical arrivals were immigrant or nonimmigrants who usu-
ally were natives of the Western Hemisphere and not subject to the head
tax.  Although arrival of the latter was not included in immigration statis-
tics, a record of that arrival may still have been made.  It cannot be said
with certainty that the definitions of statistical and nonstatistical arrivals
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rassed officers’ to set the children free.”87  Such “rebellious” children em-
ployed these “‘professional method[s]’ of shrieking and struggling to
evade apprehension, detention, and deportation.”88  The Border Patrol’s
failure to effectively manage or influence either the behavior of migrant
children or navigate their own emotional difficulties when observed in
their failure essentially led to a public shaming of child deportation.  One
might imagine that any unaccompanied minors of the time were able to
traverse the borderlands without much trouble—either coming to the at-
tention of an enterprising adult or entering of their own free will unde-
tected, unobstructed, or relinquished.
Unfortunately, the effect of this rather humorous dynamic between
Border Patrol and children ultimately served to accelerate the focus on
border enforcement.  As Kelly Lytle Herna´ndez summarized:
[W]hile U.S. and Mexican officers had not initially erected bor-
der fences to address gendered problems of state violence, the
increasingly common and troublesome confrontations between
unsanctioned women, undocumented children, and embar-
rassed officers affirmed the Border Patrol’s turn toward displac-
ing the violence of immigration law enforcement onto the
landscape of the borderlands.89
While the Border Patrol began ramping up its enforcement efforts,
parallel legislative measures enacted in Congress insulated border policies
from due process constraints with the passage of the first Immigration and
Nationality Act in 1952.90  In that very first piece of comprehensive immi-
gration legislation, Congress upended a 1950 Supreme Court ruling re-
quiring the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to
comply with the newly-enacted Administrative Procedure Act91—insulat-
ing deportation proceedings from fair hearing requirements of due pro-
cess and judicial review.92  In tandem, Border Patrol was empowered,
encouraged and incentivized to turn their attention to securing the bor-
der, rather than negotiating it.  This combination of stepped up enforce-
ment and deregulation of oversight created fertile soil in the borderlands
for abuse of discretion and impunity.
Children were not singled out in the creation of increasingly restric-
tive policies at the border in the 1960s due to a “hands-off” directive from
87. HERNA´NDEZ, supra note 65, at 136 (citing Memorandum from David Snow,
Patrol Inspector in Charge, Brownsville, Tex., to Fletcher Rawls, Chief Patrol In-
spector, McAllen, Tex., Need for Construction of Boundary Fence and Observa-
tion Towers in Vicinity of Brownsville, Texas-Matamoros, Mexico to Control Illegal
Traffic 14 (Mar. 20, 1953)).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 137.
90. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified under 8 U.S.C. ch. 12).
91. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551–559 (2012)).
92. See NGAI, supra note 65, at 88–89 n.123.
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Border Patrol leadership and “continued to cross illegally.”93  At the same
time, ad hoc refugee programs created by the government during this
time reinforced the admission preferences for migrant children with fam-
ily ties to the United States in immigration law generally.  The authority
for these programs stemmed from the passage of the Refugee Relief Act of
1953, which “broadly defined” a refugee as:
[A]ny person in a country or area which is neither Communist
nor Communist-dominated, who because of persecution, fear of
persecution, natural calamity or military operations is out of his
usual place of abode and unable to return thereto, who has not
been firmly resettled, and who is in urgent need of assistance for
the essentials of life or for transportation.94
Note the fear of ideological invasion present in the explicit exclusion
of individuals fleeing “Communist” or “Communist-dominated” countries
from the definition of refugee.  The remainder of the statute, which other-
wise reflects more humanitarian concerns, was actually more expansive
than the international human rights norms at the time.95
The failures of the first refugee programs for unaccompanied minors
at non-land borders portend the mistreatment of children at the
U.S.–Mexico border today.  Refugee minor programs struggled to secure
appropriate foster care placements, and major lapses in the government’s
ability to keep track of non-detained children resulted in unfavorable
placements.96  As these systems failures were uncovered, admissions under
these programs were dramatically reduced.
For example, in the early months of the U.S. refugee program for
Hungarians fleeing the 1956 Soviet invasion, 1,000 unaccompanied mi-
nors were admitted, but due to the lack of guidance and confusion among
social welfare agencies, the government lost track of many of the chil-
dren.97  “In response to concern[s]” raised by “relatives of unaccompa-
nied Hungarian children” to the U.S. Secretary of State, INS established a
“special program” for the admission of unaccompanied minors, separate
93. See HERNA´NDEZ, supra note 65, at 203.
94. HUTCHINSON, supra note 56, at 529 (citing Refugee Relief Act of 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 2(a), 67 Stat. 400, 400).
95. In the newly-enacted 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, the term “refugee” is defined as:
Any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country.
Convention and Protocol, supra note 28, at 14.
96. See EVERETT M. RESSLER ET AL., UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: CARE AND PRO-
TECTION IN WARS, NATURAL DISASTERS, AND REFUGEE MOVEMENTS 49–50 (1988) (dis-
cussing lack of uniform policies regarding placement of unaccompanied minors).
97. See id.
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from the general Hungarian refugee population.98  However, the new pro-
gram overcompensated for the failures of the initial reception of children
by severely restricting the possible placements for children upon arrival.99
As a result, many applications were denied, and “only 136 children” were
admitted through this program.100
Four years later, despite the exclusion of refugees from Communist-
occupied territories, federal funds were appropriated in a series of ad hoc
Cuban refugee programs to support child welfare agencies in the place-
ment and care of children; this marked the first time that federal funding
was allocated to the child welfare agencies who had been charged with
administering unaccompanied minor resettlement programs since the
Truman era.101  Despite the support of funding, neither the agencies nor
immigration services had coordinated their efforts in any cohesive way,
which led to the failure of a number of systems.  For example, because
unaccompanied children were not identified upon admission, child wel-
fare agencies spent tremendous energy identifying and placing unaccom-
panied children with caretakers “almost one year” into the migration.102
Data collected by the child-welfare agencies for record-keeping purposes
captured some numbers and documented that “at least 14,000 unaccom-
panied children” were assisted.103  Public reaction to the newly-arrived,
mostly resettled in Florida, was mixed.104  However, at least one leading
government official at the time rebuffed the fears of ideological invasion,
stating:
Many of the refugees who have entered the United States since
November, 1960, are children, and a surprisingly large number
have been unaccompanied by parents or guardians.  In the safe
environment of a normal American home, it is difficult to con-
ceive of sending one’s children alone to an alien land where lan-
guage, manners, and customs are entirely strange to them.  But
this is the choice that thousands of Cuban parents have made
and are making in the belief that the alternative—indoctrination
with the malignant seeds of communist dogma—would be infi-
nitely more detrimental to the welfare of their children.105
98. See id. at 50.
99. See id. (“[O]nly those unaccompanied minors would be admitted whose
sponsors were both relatives and U.S. citizens.”).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 53.
102. See id. at 51 (noting no agencies even recorded presence of unaccompa-
nied, Cuban children “who entered the [United States] during the first six months
of 1959”).
103. See id. (stating social service agencies documented “at least 14,000 unac-
companied children [were present in] the United States” in October 1962).
104. See, e.g., Cuban Children Helped in Florida: Charities, U.S. and State Join to Aid
10,000 Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1962, at 41.
105. Katherine Brownell Oettinger, Services to Unaccompanied Cuban Refugee
Children in the United States, 36 SOC. SERV. REV. 377, 378 (1962).  At time that she
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Issues of dependency were eclipsed by ideological concerns in this
example.  There may be several reasons for this: (1) the Cuban programs
that were enacted before the missile crisis contemplated a return of the
children to Cuba; (2) child welfare agencies self-organized and secured
funding from the federal government for the caretaking of these children,
funding which was largely unopposed due to the national and interna-
tional sympathies for post-War refugees; and, perhaps most importantly,
(3) ”most of the unaccompanied children came from middle-class families
and had attended private Catholic schools.”106  Standing in stark contrast
to darker-skinned children that would arrive later from Haiti, the Cuban
children represent an anomaly in the treatment of unaccompanied chil-
dren more generally, a privilege which remains today.107
2. The 1965 Hart-Celler Act Restricts Immigration from the Western
Hemisphere
The dependency preference was no more visible than in the second
round of comprehensive immigration legislation in modern history: the
Hart-Celler Act of 1965.  The Act featured migrant children as the primary
beneficiaries of a larger policy of family reunification, which was seen as
“the major cornerstone of the immigration admission system.”108  The
1965 amendments created a category of unlimited immigrant visas for “mi-
nor, unmarried children of citizens,” who received preference over all
other categories of immediate relatives.109  Certainly, children who other-
wise may have arrived unaccompanied benefited from these unlimited
visas that allowed them to reunify with a parent within the contemplation
of existing immigration laws.  However, lacking any provisions directly re-
lating to the care of unaccompanied children, the law reinforced the pref-
erence for the immigration of accompanied children.
Additionally, although the Hart–Celler Act provided for progressive
reforms like the elimination of the race-based national origin system, the
Act also “imposed restrictions on immigration from anywhere in the West-
ern Hemisphere,” which was a major factor leading to the crisis at the
wrote this article, Oettinger was chief of the Children’s Bureau of the Social Secur-
ity Administration, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which was
“the first national governmental agency in the world devoted entirely to promoting
the health and welfare of children.” See id. at 377.
106. See RESSLER ET AL., supra note 96, at 52.
107. For a detailed comparison of the treatment of Cuban and Haitian refu-
gees and the role of the fear of the immigrant other, see Lori A. Nessel, Externalized
Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625, 627 (2009)
(“[T]he image of poor black immigrants in rickety boats appears to evoke an un-
warranted degree of fear and resistance . . . .”).
108. See BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMI-
GRATION POLICY 118 (2006).
109. See id.
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U.S.–Mexico border today.110  Mae Ngai most recently reflected on the
“unintended consequences” of the Act, which she posits “guaranteed that
a significant portion of Mexican immigration would be unauthorized, be-
cause ongoing labor-market demands far exceeded legal avenues for en-
try.”111  Similarly, there were no carve-outs, exceptions, or provisions
relating to unaccompanied minors arriving at the border from the West-
ern Hemisphere, which would prove to be shortsighted when humanita-
rian crises exploded in Central America.
3. Ad Hoc Refugee Programs for Unaccompanied Minors Continue
Absent any legal path for admission, lawful entry of unaccompanied
children continued to be relegated to ad hoc and poorly-managed refugee
programs.  These programs impacted groups of children that the United
States pre-identified as worthy of assistance—not the unanticipated waves
of migrant children today.  As such, the systems and processes developed
in these cases were not transferrable to future populations, but their fail-
ures were instructive and served as a harbinger for future reforms.  As
more unanticipated unaccompanied children arrived from Cuba, Haiti,
and East Asia, the ad hoc programs led to systemic child abuse and human
rights violations.112
One such high-profile failure that resulted in a class-action against the
United States was “Operation Babylift,” in which the United States re-
moved thousands of children in military planes from war-torn Vietnam, en
masse, without first verifying whether removal was in the best interests of
the child or whether reunification with the children’s parents was possi-
ble.113  As one scholar remarked:
110. See THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965: LEGISLATING A NEW
AMERICA xiv (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2015).
111. See Mae Ngai, This Is How Immigration Reform Happened 50 Years Ago. It Can
Happen Again, NATION (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/this-is-
how-immigration-reform-happened-50-years-ago-it-can-happen-again/ [https://
perma.cc/TUB8-E2ZC].
112. It was during these waves of migration that unaccompanied children
were detained as a matter of course in adult detention facilities or group youth
facilities upon arrival, rather than placed in a more child-appropriate care environ-
ment.  Additionally, some children were trafficked by their foster parents, sexually
abused, and financially exploited. See SUSAN S. FORBES & PATRICIA WEISS FAGEN,
UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE CHILDREN: THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICIES—1939–
1984, 60–78 (1984); see also RESSLER ET AL., supra note 96, at 51–112 (documenting
failures of systems and resulting abuses for each wave of unaccompanied refugee
children).
113. On April 1975 a federal class action suit, Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger,
was filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights (New York City) and the
International Children’s Fund (Berkeley) on behalf of three children
brought to the United States who allegedly had parents living in Vietnam,
and any other children in similar circumstances.  The case claimed that
the basic human rights of the children had been violated by their removal
from the country without proper custody having been obtained, and by
their continued detention in the United States in custody of parties other
than their natural parents . . . .  After various appeals, the court ordered
25
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[t]he suit sought to force the government to make a determina-
tion of each child’s adoptive status; institute procedures for trac-
ing parents or relatives; prohibit adoption of the children until a
search for parents or relatives failed; and immediately return any
child found to have a living parent seeking its return.114
When entries by unaccompanied minors from Cuba surged again in
1980, the government finally “issued guidelines specifying responsibilities
and criteria for state child welfare agencies . . . . Now responsible for the
care and placement of the minors, state agencies were directed to con-
sider special needs and cultural factors in determining placement.”115
However, this era also resulted in a policy of “detain and verify,” in which
children who arrived—primarily from Cuba and Haiti—were held in de-
tention facilities, rather than other more child-appropriate settings, until
such time as their claim for relief could be determined and their place-
ment secured.116  This resulted in a dangerous precedent for future waves
of unaccompanied minors at the under-equipped southern border, and
history would repeat itself again and again to the present day due, in part,
to the lack of clear, consistent, and detailed guidelines for programs assist-
ing unaccompanied immigrant children upon their arrival.117  Notably,
the economic downturn and high rates of unemployment of the 1970s and
1980s resulted in strong public and congressional opposition to more
comprehensive and progressive refugee policy reforms.118  Congressional
leaders were not only concerned about whether refugees would compete
with Americans for jobs, but also that the lack of controls had resulted in
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to review files and make
plans for tracing overseas.
RESSLER ET AL., supra note 96, at 74.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 56; Refugee Resettlement Program; Statement of Goals, Priori-
ties, Standards, and Guidelines for the Unaccompanied Minor Refugee and Cu-
ban/Haitian Entrant Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 38147-01, 38152 (Oct. 14, 1987)
(discussing “placement options”).
116. See FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112, at 65–66 (“In the military reception
centers, which were detention centers in all essential physical aspects, the minor
children were mixed with the general adult population.  They were frequently sub-
ject to violence and abuse, were without protection or supervision, and were under
control of the military police and the INS.”).
117. A well-documented account of the failures of these ad hoc programs in-
cluded the resettlement of a group of children who became known in popular
American culture as the “Lost Boys of the Sudan.”  Public fascination with the Lost
Boys’ struggles to assimilate and the efforts of largely faith-based organizations to
assist them became a public interest story that spanned nearly a decade. See Eliza-
beth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the
U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 222 n.60 (2012) (“Because of the
compelling heartbreak of their individual and collective experiences, articles,
novels and films about the Lost Boys abound.”).
118. See Harvey Gee, The Refugee Burden: A Closer Look at the Refugee Act of 1980,
26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 559, 646 (2001) (citing PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 98 (1998)).
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“uncontrolled refugee flows.”119  The fear of economic disadvantage and
the fear of floodgates played a large role in the ad hoc nature of these
programs and their systemic failures.
B. The Refugee Act of 1980
Given that the modern history of immigration policy directed at unac-
companied children is rooted in “ad hoc and situation-specific” programs
largely focused on children isolated by acts of war and dictatorships, it
follows that the first piece of successful immigration legislation to address
the circumstances of unaccompanied immigrant children explicitly was
humanitarian in nature.120  The Refugee Act of 1980 was a comprehensive
bill aimed at the identification, assistance, and processing of all refugees
resettled to the United States, including very specific provisions regarding
unaccompanied minors.121  As with prior, unsuccessful legislative efforts,
voices raised in opposition reflected the Four Fears.  Some opponents
cited the potential for refugees to experience difficulties in assimila-
tion.122  Opponents were further concerned that the refugees would flood
the labor market, leaving American citizens with the second pick for jobs,
and used the politically-charged example of the unemployment rate of
black Americans to try to drive a wedge between racial minorities and
refugee minorities.123  Ultimately, this served only to galvanize influential
black leaders to support the bill.124
The success of the bill also had much to do with the fact that it feder-
alized the web of child welfare agencies across the country to hedge
against the likelihood of unaccompanied refugee minors becoming de-
pendent on the state and to ensure their resettlement with individuals who
119. See id. at 607 (citing GILL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED
KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA’S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT
115–17 (1986)).
120. For a detailed legislative history of the 1980 Refugee Act, see Deborah E.
Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee
Act of 1980, 6 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 693 (1983).
121. See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of Unaccompanied Children into the
United States, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 142–43 (1989); see also FORBES & FAGEN,
supra note 112, at 55.
122. See generally Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 96th Cong.
204 (1979).
123. See id. at 96–97.  In his testimony before the House of Representatives
supporting the bill, African American Civil Rights leader Bayard Rustin noted that
the black press at the time was very concerned about the unemployment rate
among young black Americans in light of the consideration to admit refugees from
what was then known as Indochina.  In response, Rustin secured the signatures of
97 out of 100 black leaders in support of a statement which read, “[i]f America can
be so insensitive and so cruel as not to accept in the American tradition, as we
always had, refugees who are in trouble, the likelihood is that that same [n]ation
will never have the sensitivity to deal with the problem of unemployment here.”
See id. at 97.
124. See id. at 96–97.
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could care for them.  The Refugee Act established and funded the Office
for Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and the Unaccompanied Refugee Minor
Program (the Program) and made explicit that the federal government
was legally responsible for any unaccompanied child who was “in transit to
the United States but before the child is [ ] placed.”125  It also provided
that children would be placed “under the laws of the States” in which they
were to be placed, and that the federal government would reimburse
those states for any placement costs incurred.126  It further required the
ORR to keep statistics on all unaccompanied children and that the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services submit an annual report to Congress
regarding their location and status.127  Finally, it gave ORR the right to
contract “with appropriate private and public nonprofit agencies.”128
Through this legislative foundation, the government established a network
of institutions, systems, and policies to reunify unaccompanied children
with their parents or other family members, if appropriate, identify alter-
nate caregivers through the child welfare system, and to support unaccom-
panied children in transition to their new life in the United States.129
The early shortcomings of these systems are well-documented.130  As
an improvement over the last several years, some best practices of the Pro-
gram have focused on the “best interest of the child” in determining long-
term care options and appropriate interim care and support.131  However,
125. See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522 (establishing Office of Refugee
Resettlement); id. § 1522 (a)(6)(A)(iv); see also U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE MINOR PROGRAM: GUIDING
PRINCIPLES AND PROMISING PRACTICES (2013) (giving historical description of pro-
gram and its goals including, “to provide placement and resettlement services to
unaccompanied refugee minors in the United States” as well as report of best prac-
tices developed to date), available at http://www.usccb.org/about/children-and-
migration/unaccompanied-refugee-minor-program/upload/united-states-unac-
companied-refugee-minor-program-guiding-principles-and-promising-practices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XKU-FLAW]; Steinbock, supra note 121, 154–57; see also
FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112, at 55.
126. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii); see also FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112,
at 55.
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1523(b)(1); see also FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112, at 55.
128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d)(2)(B)(iii); see also FORBES & FAGEN, supra note
112, at 55.
129. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1522(c)(1)(A)(ii), (d)(2)(A) (authorizing head of Office
of Refugee Resettlement to contract with and reimburse “public or private non-
profit agencies for projects specifically designed [ ] to assist refugees in obtaining
the skills which are necessary for economic self-sufficiency, including projects for
job training, employment services, day care, professional refresher training, and
other recertification services[,]” as well as “training in English where necessary”).
130. See generally FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112 and accompanying text;
Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and
Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219 (2006)
(identifying procedural gaps in detention, housing, and resettlement efforts of
DHS, ORR and their contracting agencies); Steinbock, supra note 121.
131. See generally FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112 and accompanying text;
Steinbock, supra note 121; Carrie A. Hartwell, Former Unaccompanied Refugee
Minors: Stories of Life in Resettlement 16, 239 (2011) (unpublished doctoral dis-
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for unaccompanied children at the border, the Program provides no re-
lief: children who are detained must be released by Border Patrol into the
Program in order to benefit from it.  Because Border Patrol is detaining
these children beyond the statutory maximum timeframes and/or summa-
rily deporting them absent any due process, the resources historically de-
veloped for these children are not reaching those who are in immigration
custody.
Aside from building the infrastructure for housing and processing un-
accompanied minors, the Act embodied the potential for a normative shift
toward a more inclusive immigration policy grounded in customary inter-
national human rights principles.  By adopting the United Nations Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Act performed the “significant
ideological function” of providing “a facially neutral criterion for admis-
sion”—that is to say that it was a definition void of any inclusion or exclu-
sion on the basis of country of origin—and the “broad parole authority
traditionally exercised by the Attorney General” was significantly narrowed
through the adoption of an internationally developed and recognized
standard.132  But as Daniel Steinbock observed almost a decade after its
passing, the Act “largely resolved the how of accepting unaccompanied
children, but not the why or the when.”133
Although rooted in international human rights norms, the Refugee
Act ultimately served to reinforce the notion that only certain types of suf-
fering earned children the ability to seek refuge and receive child-appro-
priate attention from immigration authorities in the United States.  The
United Nations Protocol effectively privileges certain types of immigrant
children over others, protecting only those whose persecution claims fit
within a limited definition of “refugee”—those who are unwilling or una-
ble to go back to their countries due to “a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.”134  Some of the chief critiques of the
sertation, University of Michigan) (suggesting that while Unaccompanied Refugee
Minor Programs (URMPs) have provided range of services to URMs in their care,
URMs would be better served if URMPs incorporated services and programs de-
signed specifically for URM population, as opposed to traditional URMPs modeled
on or combined with American foster care); Refugee Resettlement Program; State-
ment of Goals, Priorities, Standards, and Guidelines for the Unaccompanied Mi-
nor Refugee and Cuban/Haitian Entrant Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 38147-01, 38151
(Oct. 14, 1987).
132. See Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV.
865, 878, 881 (1982) (citing Refugee Act of 1980).
133. See Steinbock, supra note 121, at 139.
134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42).  The Refugee Act codified the international
definition of “refugee” in the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act:
The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
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United Nations Protocol are that it contemplates only state-sponsored per-
secution and is under-inclusive in that it does not capture all of the rea-
sons why refugees flee.135  For example, gender discrimination is not
included in the definition, and neither is forced conscription nor gang
recruitment.136  These limitations effectively exclude many Central and
South American unaccompanied children who have fled specifically for
these reasons.137
Other definitional problems presented themselves in the interpreta-
tion of the Act: for example, as Steinbock identified in an early critique,
the term “unaccompanied” was interpreted by the federal government so
narrowly that, in practice, children entering the United States with an ex-
tended family member or entering to be placed with any relative were
largely excluded from the definition.138  As a result, children without any
adult guidance were left to articulate their eligibility under the Act without
legal representation or advice, and children accompanied by some family-
member adult were precluded from articulating their claim altogether.
Interpretation problems ultimately gave rise to a larger critique that,
although the Act set forth criterion for the admission of unaccompanied
minors, it did not “contain any special provisions that govern the processing
of unaccompanied minors for admission to the United States.”139  Any
specific processes and procedures for unaccompanied child refugees
presenting themselves at land-based ports of entry at the border were not
articulated in the scheme of admission.140  That function was left to the
discretion of existing immigration authorities and systems: Customs and
Border Patrol and Immigration Judges with nearly limitless, unchecked
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,
or (B) in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate
consultation . . . may specify . . . .
Id.
135. See generally PETER NYERS, RETHINKING REFUGEES: BEYOND STATES OF EMER-
GENCY (2006) (critiquing state-centric views of refugees, traditional responses to
refugee movements and United Nations definition of refugee).
136. See Convention and Protocol, supra note 28, at 14 (including “any person
who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” in
definition of refugee and failing to include gender in list of accepted bases of
persecution).
137. See infra notes 113–44 and accompanying text.
138. See Steinbock, supra note 121, at 157–58.
139. See FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112, at 58 (emphasis added); see also Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(b)(3) (authorizing Secretary to “make arrange-
ments . . . for the temporary care of refugees in the United States in emergency
circumstances, including the establishment of processing centers” but failing to
provide method of processing).
140. See generally Marincas v. Lewis, 97 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that
“the Refugee Act of 1980 mandated that the Attorney General establish a proce-
dure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border, or
port of entry” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  However, the Act failed to
provide for procedure within statute. See id.
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discretion being chief among them.  Processing norms developed in a vac-
uum of statutory guidance.  While the Act built an infrastructure to receive
unaccompanied children once they made it past the border, it gave very
little guidance to immigration officials to efficiently identify, process, and
admit qualifying children at the border.
This implementation gap proved problematic almost immediately af-
ter the Act was signed into law as waves of unaccompanied Haitian and
Cuban children arrived in the United States without the pre-designation
of “refugee” status.  Within one month of its enactment, government offi-
cials failed to properly identify unaccompanied children among the mi-
grants in the Mariel boatlift from Cuba.141  There were no screening
processes in place to sort out the relationships between the migrant chil-
dren and the migrant adults.142  Children who may have otherwise been
eligible for the newly established ORR programs were not directed to it.143
Simultaneously, the government summarily turned away or admitted, but
failed to properly care for Haitian refugees, including minors, attempting
to enter via boat from Haiti and the Bahamas.144
In response to complaints of disparate treatment between the two
groups, namely, that arriving Cubans were released while arriving Haitians
were detained—including the detention of children in adult facilities con-
trary to laws specifying that no children under the age of fifteen be de-
tained—and despite the similarity of the claims of persecution from
children and families fleeing both countries, President Carter’s adminis-
tration “announced that Cubans and Haitians would be treated
‘equally’ . . . .  The equal treatment consisted of granting refugee status to
neither group, and creating the Entrant category145 for both.”146  The fol-
lowing year, the Reagan administration took a much tougher stance when
responding to the Haitian influx by summarily rejecting the admission of
the vast majority of migrants seeking refuge in the United States—a deci-
sion that may have had more to do with the fact that Haitians were fleeing
an American-ally dictator, rather than a communist oppressor.  For Hai-




145. The “Cuban Haitian Entrant” category was defined as
(1) any individual granted parole status as a Cuban/Haitian entrant . . .
or granted any other special status subsequently established under the
immigration laws for nationals of Cuba or Haiti, regardless of the status of
the individual at the time assistance or services are provided; and (2) any
other national of Cuba or Haiti  . . . (B) [who is not subject to] a final,
non-appealable and legally enforceable order of deportation or
exclusion.
Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, § 501(e), 94 Stat.
1799, 1810.  The person must also be in removal proceedings under the INA, or
“ha[ve] an application for asylum pending with the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service.” See id. §§ 501(e)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii), 94 Stat. at 1810.
146. See FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112, at 69–70.
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tian children who were admitted, difficulties in the process of family
reunification and placement resulted in failed placements, additional ex-
pense to the government, and the mistreatment and exploitation of some
children within the United States.147  As Ira Kurzban observed in his early,
critical examination of the Act:
Although much heralded as the end of the political use of the
refugee process, the Act actually embodies executive choice.  Try
as it might, Congress has failed to remedy the most pressing
problem plaguing our admissions program: the absence of legal
standards to define refugee status, thereby allowing the wholesale
infusion of political biases into a purportedly neutral policy.148
Notably, unaccompanied children were eventually carved out, again
by a Presidential Directive, issued in May, 1983, that specifically indicated
that unaccompanied minors should be considered by the Attorney Gen-
eral as those for whom group refugee status should be considered under
the Refugee Act.149
An influential policy analysis of these early programs conducted by
the Refugee Policy Group in 1984 recommended that the government di-
rect its attention toward articulating clearer policies and procedures for
the agencies involved to ensure that “unaccompanied minors are pro-
tected, in accordance with child welfare principles” at two critical points:
(1) apprehension and detention and (2) foster care placements.150  The
recommendations noted the particular challenge of determining whether
a child is unaccompanied and recommended that processes for quickly
identifying them, particularly during emergencies, should be made clear
to all affected agencies and subject to public review and discussion, “to
ensure that they are in accordance with the best interests of the chil-
dren.”151  Although there have been major developments in terms of fos-
ter care placements for unaccompanied children since the report, most of
the reforms have focused on the placement of the children once they
clear the border.  Very few developments have focused on procedures to
protect them at the time of apprehension and detention.
In sum, although the ORR and the URM programs have been further
developed in the last thirty-five years and expanded to include other clas-
ses of undocumented migrant children, as will be discussed infra, the gap
between those who enforce immigration laws and those who assist unac-
companied minors has widened.  This fate was predicted by the historical
patterns of which the Refugee Act itself was a product: first, the privileging
147. See id. at 71–77.
148. Kurzban, supra note 132, at 867 (footnotes omitted).
149. See National Security Decision Directive on Refugee Policy and Process-
ing Refugees from Indochina (May 13, 1983), reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S26840
(1987).
150. See FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112, at 80–83.
151. See id. at 80–81.
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of certain categories of worthiness, blamelessness, and need over others,
and second, the ability of the executive to work around the facially neutral
definition of “refugee” to admit or exclude the unaccompanied children
from particular countries at its discretion.  Rather than safeguard against
this historical bias, the Act served to reinforce it.  Because the definition of
refugee was so limiting, it empowered the executive to exclude certain
groups by using immigration classifications subject to the political priori-
tization of the executive.  Finally, because the Refugee Act addressed only
the criterion for admission and not processing, it cultivated a fertile
ground for abuse and neglect at the hands of immigration authorities with
unlimited discretion to exclude any child that they deem unworthy from
the systems and processes put in place to protect that child.
II. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION DEFINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR FOR
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN AT THE BORDER
Public law litigation, famously defined by Abram Chayes, has been the
most effective tool in setting forth guidelines for the treatment of unac-
companied minors at the U.S.–Mexico border.152  A boom in class actions
concerning the rights of unaccompanied children over the last four de-
cades has begun to address the historical truth articulated by a former
immigration judge: “children are the biggest void in all of immigration
law.”153  However, just two years after the passage of the Refugee Act of
1980, the very first Supreme Court case to hold that the Constitution ap-
plies to undocumented immigrants present in the United States was a case
concerning immigrant children.154  The Plyler Court outlawed education
discrimination against migrant children and required any state seeking to
limit its access to public education to establish a “compelling state inter-
152. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (describing concept of public law litigation).  Chayes
stated:
[T]he dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that law-
suits do not arise out of disputes between private parties about private
rights.  Instead, the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional
or statutory policies . . . . Most important, the trial judge has increasingly
become the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief,
which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and re-
quire the judge’s continuing involvement in administration and
implementation.
Id.
153. See Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, Seeking Asylum Alone: Unaccompa-
nied and Separated Children and Refugee Protection in the U.S., 1 J. HIST. CHILDHOOD &
YOUTH 127, 129 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Interview by
Susan Schmidt with Joseph Vail, former Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immi-
gration Review, in Hous, Tex. (Mar. 29, 2004)).
154. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION
OUTSIDE THE LAW 7 (2014) (“All nine justices in Plyler agreed that the Constitution
in some way applies to unauthorized migrants.  In other words, constitutional pro-
tections come, at least initially, with physical presence in the United States,
whether or not that presence is lawful.”).
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est” for doing so.155  Scholars have discussed at length the limited impact
of the 5-4 decision, designating it as a constitutional “high-water mark” in
immigration jurisprudence.156  But the Justices’ unanimous conclusion
that immigrant children lawfully or unlawfully present in the country are
still “persons” under the U.S. Constitution still serves as the starting point
for determining what rights attach to that personhood.157  In fact, over
the next three decades, federal courts would continue to shape and define
the rights of unaccompanied minors, setting forth a new legal framework
that rejected the fears that informed immigration legislation, relying in-
stead on an equitable balancing of interests.  And as legislation built the
infrastructure of rights, legislation codifying the new structure followed.
Beginning with Plyler, federal litigation has pushed back on the cycle of
fear and restriction that defined the regulation of unaccompanied minors
for centuries.
A. Points of Adjudication and the Effect of the “Entry Fiction” Doctrine
Unaccompanied minors who cross the U.S.–Mexico border come to
the attention of immigration adjudicative bodies in three very different
scenarios.  First, they may present themselves or be detected by immigra-
tion officials at the border and processed according to the procedures de-
tailed in this article, with the hope of ultimately raising their eligibility for
relief before an immigration judge as a defense to removal.  Second, they
may enter the United States undetected and come to the attention of fed-
eral or state law enforcement through state child welfare or criminal jus-
tice systems, which then may refer or transfer them to federal immigration
authorities.158  Third, they may enter the United States undetected and
155. Notably, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the subject children
arrived with their parents and did not enter the country unlawfully of their own
volition. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (“[L]egislation directing the onus of a parent’s
misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions
of justice.”).  This is distinguishable from many cases involving unaccompanied
minors who do arrive in the United States of their own free will. See id. at 238
(“The appellee children are innocent in this respect.  They can ‘affect neither
their parents’ conduct nor their own status.’” (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 770 (1977))).
156. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2043 n.20 (2008) (citing multiple scholars’ works discussing limited impact
of Plyler); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 151, at 7 (discussing impact of Plyler
decision).
157. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (“[E]ven aliens whose presence in this country
is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886))).  For an analysis of the rights of non-citizens
articulated by the courts before and after Plyler and the effect on legal personhood,
see Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immi-
grants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367 (2013).
158. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS’ ASSISTANCE IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELATED MATTERS 13–14
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affirmatively bring themselves to the attention of immigration by filing an
application for any form of relief for which they are eligible.  In almost all
cases where undocumented children apply for immigration status from
the interior of the United States, their unlawful entry, which may other-
wise interfere with an adult’s application, is waived or waivable by opera-
tion of law.159  The same is true for children who are brought to the
attention of immigration authorities through their interaction with state
government agencies.  In fact, a criminal plea or conviction that would
otherwise bar admission may be waived if the crime involved is not one of
moral turpitude and the child was charged as a juvenile.  In those cases,
the criminal offense is treated as if it never occurred.160
Adjudications at the border are complicated by the persistence of
what is called the “entry fiction.”  The “entry fiction” is a doctrine by which
individuals who are physically detained within the United States but who
were apprehended at the border are deemed not to have entered the
United States for the purposes of determining what individual rights are
triggered.  The Ninth Circuit has described the “entry fiction . . . as a fairly
narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive
branch must follow before turning an immigrant away.”161  In other
(2015), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-local-assis
tance-immigration-enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK3J-P9WR]; Juliet P.
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 1557 (2008) (analyzing evolution of influence on immigration law from
exclusive hands of federal government to state and local governments); Michael J.
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1084 (2004) (demonstrating federal initiatives to involve state and local enforce-
ment agencies in immigration enforcement).
159. For example, for special immigrant juvenile applicants, the waiver is
found at INA § 245(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2) (2012).
160. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(ii)(I).  The
BIA has consistently held that acts of juvenile delinquency are not “crimes” for the
purposes of immigration law, and that a determination of juvenile delinquency
cannot qualify as a “conviction” of a crime—regardless of the elements of the un-
derlying offense. See, e.g., In re Devison-Charles, 22 I & N Dec. 1362, 1372–73 (BIA
2000) (“[A]s to persons who have been found to be juveniles and have been
treated as juvenile offenders in the disposition of their cases, we find that this
provision has no application.” (quoting In re C-M, 5 I & N Dec. 327, 329 (BIA
1953))); In re Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I & N Dec. 135, 135 (BIA 1981) (holding “[a]n
act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime in the United States and an adjudication
of delinquency is not a conviction for a crime within the meaning of the [INA]”);
In re A, 3 I & N Dec. 368, 371 (BIA 1948) (“Conviction as a juvenile offender is not
a conviction rising to such a degree of guilt or involving such moral turpitude as to
require a finding that appellant is not of good moral character.”); In re M-U, 2 I &
N Dec. 92, 93 (BIA 1944) (“[T]he respondent was only about 15 years of age at the
time of the theft . . . . It therefore follows that the admission of the offense con-
tained in the record was not admission of a crime . . . .”).  Similarly, the BIA has
ruled that an admission to an act of juvenile delinquency, even when the underly-
ing offense may otherwise qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, does not
trigger a finding of inadmissibility. See id. at 93.  Note, however, that an immigra-
tion judge retains absolute discretion in these cases, and even sealed juvenile of-
fenses can result in an unfavorable exercise of discretion.
161. See Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004).
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words, although someone is physically within the custody of border patrol,
legally he or she is not within the territory of the United States and the
Constitution may not apply.  The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this to
mean that only due process challenges relevant to the exclusion proceed-
ings are allowed until the individual has been deemed to have entered.162
Due process scrutiny does not apply to claims of official use of excessive
force that are not directly connected to making a determination on
whether to exclude.163  As such, unaccompanied children who are subject
to pre-entry exclusion proceedings are the most vulnerable due to a legal
fiction.164  Aside from those to whom this legal fiction is applied, federal
litigation has expanded the due process rights of children at the southern
border.
B. Courts Define Due Process for Unaccompanied Minors
at the Southern Border
Litigation specifically regarding the detention conditions at the south-
ern border was triggered in 1983 when the Salvadoran Civil War led to a
mass diaspora of unaccompanied children.165  The government’s re-
sponse to this migration led to what one border anthropologist has
termed a “state of exception” for unaccompanied children in which “auto-
matic detention [became] the new norm and release [became] the excep-
tion.”166  She observes that “[o]nce the state of exception was firmly
established, the rationale for detaining a vulnerable population became
both a self-authorizing status and a moral imperative.”167  Even children
who articulated a credible fear of persecution and may have been eligible
for asylum or some other form of humanitarian-based immigration relief
were immediately detained pending further investigation into their
claims.168
This “detain and verify” policy embodied a number of assumptions
rooted in the Four Fears: (1) that the children may have been fabricating
their refugee stories; (2) that the children may constitute a flight risk;
162. See Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir. 2006).
163. See id. (“‘[W]hatever due process rights excludable aliens may be denied
by virtue of their status, they are entitled under the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands of state
or federal officials.’” (quoting Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir.
1987))).
164. See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons
from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 951–52 (1995).
165. See generally Sarah Gammage, El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigra-
tion Continues, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (July 26, 2007), available at http://www
.migrationpolicy.org/article/el-salvador-despite-end-civil-war-emigration-continues
[https://perma.cc/RY7A-VM6J].
166. See SUSAN J. TERRIO, WHOSE CHILD AM I? UNACCOMPANIED, UNDOCU-
MENTED CHILDREN IN U.S. IMMIGRATION CUSTODY 10 (2015).
167. Id.
168. See FORBES & FAGEN, supra note 112, at 74–77.
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(3) that the children may have ulterior and nefarious motives for seeking
entry; (4) that the state was required to detain them in order to ensure
that they did not become a public charge; or (5) that their entry was a
criminal act and therefore their liberty was justifiably infringed upon.  It
also cloaked these children with a veneer of undesirability, rather than
suitability because it assumed that the country would be best served by
severely restricting their ability to participate in its society.  This state of
exception originated with the Haitian arrivals of the late 1970s, discussed
in Part I, but the Salvadoran diaspora brought its institutionalized racism
to the southern border.169
The difference between the government’s initial treatments of the
two groups is essential: the former groups were considered refugees ab-
sent the need for court intervention; government funding and resources
had already been committed to receiving and processing the children who
arrived, even if it meant spreading them out in detention facilities across
the country.170  The Salvadoran diaspora was not formally recognized as a
refugee event by the United States government and, therefore, Border Pa-
trol could not release these individuals from custody absent an admissibil-
ity determination.171  Many of those in custody applied for asylum, but the
majority of the claims were deemed frivolous—only “[two] percent of ap-
plications were approved.”172  As such, the volume of detainees reached
169. See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text.
170. See Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confine-
ment and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1087, 1125 (1995) (explaining that, in violation of its own policy to parole Cuban
and Haitian unaccompanied children into community, INS instead detained over
one hundred Haitian and Cuban children “at the overcrowded Krome SPC . . .
while many more were held in detention camps at Guantanamo Bay” (footnote
omitted) (citing news reports of confinement conditions)); see also A Slow-Motion
Mariel: Cubans (and Haitians) Take to Sea, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1091, 1091–92
(1994) (explaining detention of Haitian and Cuban refugees at Guantanamo Bay).
171. See Suzan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
central-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era [https://perma.cc/PW2K-EBV5]
(“Characterizing the Salvadorans and Guatemalans as ‘economic migrants,’ the
Reagan administration denied that the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments
had violated human rights.  As a result, approval rates for Salvadoran and Guate-
malan asylum cases were under three percent in 1984.”); see also A Humanitarian
Call to Action: Unaccompanied Children in Removal Proceedings Present a Critical Need for
Legal Representation, ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGR. (June 3, 2015), http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/immigration/UACSstatement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9JV-8CZK] (“DHS initially insisted on continued mandatory
detention even after the families were found to have established a ‘credible fear’ of
return to their home countries . . . indicating a significant possibility of qualifying
for asylum or withholding of removal and permitting them to proceed with seek-
ing relief before the immigration court.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)) (2012))).
172. This is not to suggest that the applications were frivolous—many individ-
uals were not represented by counsel and faced many obstacles to articulating a
successful claim. See Gammage, supra note 162 (noting INS was forced to recon-
sider applications for asylum previously considered “frivolous” after class action).
37
Rogerson: The Politics of Fear: Unaccompanied Immigrant Children and the Ca
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
880 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 843
crisis levels for which the Border Patrol was ill-prepared.173  Judicial inter-
vention became necessary, both to curb the rights violations being com-
mitted by immigration authorities, but also to establish this movement of
individuals a humanitarian crisis deserving of the protections of The Refu-
gee Act.
1. The Orantes Litigation (1982–1988): The Right of Access to Counsel
The Border Patrol’s abuse of Salvadorans during this time period was
so widespread that it resulted in the first federal class action to challenge
border policies.174  The outcome of this litigation continues to serve as a
basis for the due process rights of unaccompanied children at the border
today.  The certified class was comprised of “all citizens and nationals of El
Salvador eligible to apply for political asylum . . . who [ ] have been or will
be taken into custody . . . by agents of the [INS].”175  In response to the
initial lawsuit, the government resurrected nearly every single one of the
Four Fears in opposition to the petitioner’s request for relief:
Faced with an ever-increasing backlog of asylum applications
from aliens of several nationalities, the agency fears that the pro-
posed notice would encourage even more applications and would ex-
haust its already strained resources.  Further, because of the
predicted need to divert INS resources to handling the addi-
tional claims, the Chief Counsel argued that the agency will be
unable to fulfill its function of protecting the borders.  Counsel urged
the Court to consider the public interest in limiting the inflow of
aliens who will take jobs from American citizens and lay claim to limited
social services.176
Rejecting these fears, the Court granted a preliminary injunction,
finding evidence of a number of abuses, including: “immigration officials
provid[ing] misleading information to Salvadoran detainees regarding
their right to apply for political asylum,” the denial of “adequate access to
173. See Taylor, supra note 167, at 1113–16 (explaining that detention centers
were overcrowded and under-staffed in 1980s, particularly in 1989 and 1990 “when
the INS announced a sudden crackdown to detain asylum applicants at facilities in
South Texas”).
174. See generally Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith (Orantes I), 541 F. Supp. 351
(C.D. Cal. 1982); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese (Orantes II), 685 F. Supp. 1488
(C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549
(9th Cir. 1990).
175. See Orantes I, 541 F. Supp. at 355.
176. Id. at 378–79 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The argument that
the border would fail if immigration officials were required to comply with basic
human rights obligations is a repackaging of the fear of invasion and terrorism.
The government used the idea of the destruction of law and order at the border as
a threat of retaliation for being forced to comply with the relief sought.  Because
the government could commit additional resources to ensure that such a deterio-
ration of the border did not occur, the threat is merely a thinly-veiled attempt to
drum up fears of lawlessness and invasion.
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counsel and [ ] information about their rights,” and the “[placement of]
Salvadoran detainees into solitary confinement without an administrative
hearing.”177  The case was then litigated for six more years until a perma-
nent order guaranteeing certain due process rights was issued in 1988.
The Orantes litigation was the first to expose the abuses at the border,
and it resulted in a permanent, nationwide injunction mandating that
Salvadorans in immigration custody receive written notice about their
rights, access to telephones, counsel, and legal materials in detention.178
The permanent order also enjoined immigration officials from coercing
class members into agreeing “to voluntarily depart” the country.179  De-
spite several appeals, the injunction stands today.180  Human rights groups
recently invoked the Orantes injunction when they were denied access to
unaccompanied minors from El Salvador being held in detention.181  The
government was ordered to produce a representative sample of the class to
meet with their attorneys, upholding the right of access to counsel.182  Al-
though it remains applicable only to Salvadoran detainees, Orantes estab-
lished certain minimum due process rights for detained individuals, which
remain helpful in connecting unaccompanied Salvadoran children to
counsel.
2. Perez-Funez (1984–1986): Right of Access to Counsel and Legal
Information
The next suit filed to enjoin the government from violating the rights
of unaccompanied children in detention was the Perez-Funez v. District Di-
rector, I.N.S.183 line of cases.  The primary allegations against immigration
officials involved coercive tactics used by border patrol officials to con-
vince children to accept voluntary departure, a form of consent to removal
from the United States.184  Although the class action was brought on be-
half of detained children from El Salvador, the approved class was much
wider:
177. See The Orantes Injunction, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., (Mar. 2011), https:/
/www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/orantesinjunction/ [https://per
ma.cc/6ZZP-KE6E].
178. See Orantes II, 685 F. Supp. at 1511–13 (listing resources court forced INS
to provide detainees after Orantes II).
179. See id. at 1513.
180. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F. Supp. 2d 825, 876 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (“[T]he injunction remains necessary to ensure that Salvadorans are able to
exercise their right to apply for asylum freely and intelligently.”), aff’d sub nom.
Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder, 321 F. App’x 625, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2009).
181. See Federal Court Orders Department of Homeland Security to Allow Class Action




183. Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
184. See id. at 657 (noting plaintiff claimed INS presented him with voluntary
departure form “without advising him of his rights in a meaningful manner”).
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All persons who appear, are known, or claim to be under the age
of eighteen years who are now or in the future taken into or held
in custody in the United States by agents of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for possible deportation from the United
States, and who are not accompanied by at least one of their nat-
ural or lawful parents at the time of being taken or received in
custody within the United States.185
Plaintiffs’ original prayer for relief was for the appointment of coun-
sel to children in the custody of immigration, arguing that it would ensure
consideration of a child’s best interest when determining whether depor-
tation was appropriate and would make the cases move along “more
quickly.”186  The government raised concerns that, because there were so
few immigration judges to handle the cases, “class members . . . [and] all
aliens undergoing any type of administrative proceeding” would have
longer detentions.187  This argument harkened back to the arguments
that the government raised in Orantes with respect to fear of floodgates.
The judge ordered the officials to “adopt certain supplementary pro-
cedures when processing class members to ensure that they are meaning-
fully and adequately advised of their rights, much in the same way that
police officers are required to deliver Miranda warnings.”188  In likening
the protections that were to be afforded to Miranda, the court invoked the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in addition to the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.189  However, the court cited statutes and
case law for denying relief in the form of appointed counsel.190
In addition to providing a written explanation of their rights read
aloud to them, a list of free legal services in the area and access to tele-
phones to call a parent, relative, friend or attorney, the final injunction
provided that “for all children except those who are Mexicans or Canadi-
ans who were apprehended in the immediate vicinity of the border, DHS
also must ensure that the child actually communicates, by telephone or other-
wise, with a parent, close adult relative or friend, or an attorney or legal
services organization.”191  “The injunction was originally entered in 1984,
185. Id.
186. See Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 611 F. Supp. 990, 1004 (C.D.
Cal.1984).
187. See id. (citing INS’s motion in opposition to preliminary injunction).
188. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
190. See Perez-Funez, 611 F. Supp. at 1004 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2012);
Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1974)).
191. See The U.S. Government’s Response to the Current Influx of Unaccompanied
Children at the Border and Its Obligations Under Existing Court Orders, NAT’L IMMIGR.
LAW CTR. (June 20, 2014), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforce-
ment/fedsresponsekids/ [https://perma.cc/753Y-3YG5].
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was modified and made permanent in 1985, and further modified in
1986.”192
Apart from the settlement, it is the court’s articulation of a new bal-
ancing test that may one day be viewed as the turning point for the rights
of unaccompanied minors.  Noting the unique vulnerabilities of children
in detention, the judge found that “it is obvious to the [c]ourt that the
situation faced by unaccompanied minors is inherently coercive.”193  He
then engaged in a balancing test of three factors established by the Su-
preme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge194: (1) “the private interest . . . af-
fected”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of [rights] . . . and the
probable value, if any, of additional safeguards”; and (3) “the
[g]overnment’s interest,” determining “that past and current INS proce-
dures violate the due process rights of plaintiff class.”195  Discussed in fur-
ther detail in Part IV of this Article, nothing in the three Mathews factors
echoes any of the Four Fears.  In fact, the first two factors are child-cen-
tered, focusing directly on the individual liberties at stake.  As future
courts would separate legitimate government interests from fear-monger-
ing, this balancing test would provide a more legitimate frame through
which to map out and shape the appropriate landscape of due process for
unaccompanied minors at the border.
C. The Flores Settlement (1993)
The Supreme Court took up the issue of the due process rights of
unaccompanied minors from El Salvador detained at the border in the
landmark case of Reno v. Flores.196  The case was filed to seek a remedy for
the protracted detention of children under a new policy that allowed for
indefinite detention until such time as a child could be released to par-
ents, close relatives, or legal guardians absent “unusual and compelling
circumstances.”197  As was the case in the Perez-Funez line of cases, the class
was expanded to consist of “all persons under the age of eighteen years
192. The Nationwide Perez-Funez Permanent Injunction Provisions for Unaccompa-
nied Children in DHS Custody, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR. 1 (June 2014), https://www
.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Perez-Funez-perm-inj-requirements-2014-
06-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE5P-H6VS].
193. See Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 662 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(citing Orantes I, 541 F. Supp. 351, 377 (C.D. Cal. 1982)).
194. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
195. See id. at 321; Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 659, 669 (applying “three-part
balancing test for the resolution of procedural due process issues”).
196. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
197. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 292 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (2015)) (“Respon-
dents contend that they have a right under the Constitution and immigration laws
to be routinely released into the custody of other ‘responsible adults.’”); see also
Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (“Plaintiffs contend that
defendants’ policy of routinely strip searching detained juvenile aliens violates the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Flores
v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We now affirm the district court’s
order.”), rev’d sub nom. Flores, 507 U.S. at 315.
41
Rogerson: The Politics of Fear: Unaccompanied Immigrant Children and the Ca
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
884 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 843
who have been, are, or will be apprehended and detained pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252 by the INS within the INS’s Western Region.”198  The litiga-
tion that followed culminated in the first “nationwide policy for the deten-
tion, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS.”199
In Flores, the Scalia-led majority explained at length its decision not to
incorporate a “best interests” standard, benchmarking its expectations of
the government’s obligations to children in its custody to “minimum re-
quirements of child care.”200  Rejecting the applicability of the asserted
liberty interest at stake, freedom from physical restraint, the majority re-
duced the due process claim to one of administrative procedure: “the al-
leged right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal
guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in
the custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a govern-
ment-operated or government-selected child-care institution.”201  The rhe-
torical impact of referring to immigration detention as “child care”
provided a logical loophole to shift the focus of the case away from the
individual due process rights of children and toward political deference to
the executive on matters of immigration.
In an impassioned dissent, Justice Stevens compared the treatment of
unaccompanied minors to that of juvenile delinquents and took issue with
the majority setting aside the best interests of the child.202  He reasoned
from an individual rights perspective that children are denied basic liber-
ties when the minimum standard of care articulated is akin to that af-
forded to juvenile delinquents rather than similarly-situated law-abiding
children:
These juveniles do not want to be committed to institutions that
the INS and the Court believe are “good enough” for aliens sim-
ply because they conform to standards that are adequate for the
incarceration of juvenile delinquents.  They want the same kind
of liberty that the Constitution guarantees similarly situated citi-
zens.  And as I read our precedents, the omission of any provi-
sion for individualized consideration of the best interests of the
198. See Meese, 681 F. Supp. at 666 (footnote omitted) (noting plaintiffs are
individuals “who have been, are, or will be subjected to, inter alia, a strip or body
cavity search upon admission to an INS detention facility, after meeting with per-
sons other than their attorneys, or at any other time or occasion absent demonstra-
ble adequate cause.”).
199. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 6, Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp.
665 (C.D. Cal. 1988), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/flo-
res_v_meese_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MN8-KM56] [hereinafter Stipu-
lated Settlement Agreement].
200. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 304.
201. See id. at 302.
202. See id. at 320, 348 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s opinion
that “devote[d] considerable attention to debunking the notion that ‘the best in-
terests of the child’ is an ‘absolute and exclusive’ criterion for the Government’s
exercise of the custodial responsibilities that it undertakes”).
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juvenile in a rule authorizing an indefinite period of detention of
presumptively innocent and harmless children denies them pre-
cisely that liberty.203
He further likened immigration detention to serving a criminal sen-
tence in terms of the similarities in the deprivation of liberty comparable
in each:
It makes little difference that juveniles, unlike adults, are always
in some form of custody, for detention in an institution pursuant
to the regulation is vastly different from release to a responsible
person . . . .  In many ways the difference is comparable to the
difference between imprisonment and probation or parole.
Both conditions can be described as “legal custody,” but the con-
stitutional dimensions of individual “liberty” identify the great di-
vide that separates the two.204
The Flores settlement agreement also requires that juveniles be re-
leased from custody “without unnecessary delay . . . to a parent; [ ] legal
guardian, [ ] an adult relative . . . individual or entity specifically desig-
nated by the parent, licensed program . . . or an adult seeking custody”
deemed appropriate by the responsible government agency.205  A number
of international and national human rights organizations have docu-
mented the human rights violations resulting from the failure to imple-
ment the Flores settlement in any meaningful way.206
D. Legislation for the 21st-Century Unaccompanied Child
Between 1990 and 2008, a series of legislative efforts, some successful
and some not, significantly impacted the situation of unaccompanied mi-
nors in immigration law and policy.  In 1990, the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act was amended to include protections for children who were in
203. Id. at 348 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 322–23 (footnotes omitted) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972)).
205. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 196, at 9–10.
206. See Prison Guard or Parent?: INS Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee Chil-
dren, WOMEN’S COMM’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN 29 (May 2002), http:/
/www.refworld.org/pdfid/49ae53f32.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CJB-GM2T] (noting
administrator of one holding facility “indicated that he had never heard of the
Flores agreement”); Refugees and Migrants in the United States: Families and Unaccompa-
nied Children, INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS 93 (July 24, 2015), https://
www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2RQ9-BJQS] (discussing failure of Flores settlement to force holding facilities to
provide “most basic necessities”); Slipping Through the Cracks: Unaccompanied Chil-
dren Detained by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PROJECT (1997), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us974.pdf [https://perma.cc/CXP5-PV3M] (noting evidence that
Flores requirements are not being met at detention facility in Arizona).
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juvenile court but could not be returned to their parents.207  After several
amendments to the law in 1997 and 2008, this very limited form of relief,
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, is available to children if they can show
that they have been abused, abandoned, or neglected in their home coun-
try by one or both parents, or that their parents and other caretakers have
died.208  These children are in a uniquely precarious position because
their government does not have a child welfare infrastructure to support
them.  If deported, they are left homeless and vulnerable to exploitation
by gangs, cartels, child soldier recruiters, and human traffickers.209  But
the process involved in obtaining a special form of immigration relief
available to them has been criticized for its clumsy reliance on state family
courts to determine the child’s best interests and its narrow focus.210  It
requires children to file lawsuits essentially alleging that their parents are
unfit.
This last critique is worth highlighting because in many of these cases,
the claim for parental neglect is crafted by using privileged, American
207. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978,
5005–06.
208. Relief for Special Immigrant Juveniles was limited to those who suffer
“abuse, neglect, or abandonment” in 1997. See Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-119, sec. 113, § 1101(a)(27)(J), 111 Stat. 2440, 2460.  This limitation was eased
somewhat by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2008, which expanded the definition, provided protections for children
at risk of aging out of the status (freezing their age at the date of filing), removed
additional grounds of inadmissibility (stowaways, unlawful presence, misrepresen-
tation and presence without inspection), and required immigration services to pro-
cess the applications within a 180 day window in a more timely manner. See Pub. L.
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).  We have represented several of these children
in the clinics at Albany Law School.  Children in this situation are often eligible for
a Special Immigrant Juvenile visa, which provides a path to a green card and even-
tually naturalization if they are successful in their application. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
209. See Emily Rose Gonzalez, Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat: Special
Immigrant Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of Status, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 409,
409–10 (2009) (describing stories of three potentially Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status-eligible children without family in their respective home countries); Maria
LoPiccolo, Comment, You Don’t Have to Go Home, but You Can’t Stay Here: Problems
Arising When SIJS Meets International Adoption, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 194, 197 (2015)
(describing story of eighteen-year-old soccer player from The Gambia abandoned
by both parents at age of thirteen).
210. See Elizabeth Keyes, Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The Case of
Migrant Children, 19 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 34–57 (2016) (describing “tension
between states and the federal government” in recent developments of law and
critiquing deference to role and competence of state court); Jessica R. Pulitzer,
Note, Fear and Failing in Family Court: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and the State
Court Problem, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 201, 214–23 (2014) (outlining procedu-
ral and substantive inconsistencies in applying Special Immigration Juvenile Status
statute and explaining that because “[e]ach state has its own domestic law codes
for its family and juvenile courts . . . .  [P]olicies and procedures vary from state to
state, and even between jurisdictions within the same state” (footnote omitted)
(citing Maria Virginia De Los Santos, SIJS: Problems with Substantive Immigration Law
and Guidelines for Improvement, 3 J. RACE, GENDER, & POVERTY 81, 94 (2012))).
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parenting standards to judge parents who are functioning in very different
socio-economic circumstances.  It also delegitimizes poverty alone as a ba-
sis for children seeking a better life in the United States.  Most Central and
South American countries face inordinate wait times due to restricted
availability of immigrant visas.  Children who wait in that line are adults by
the time their applications for lawful admission are even considered.  It is
for this reason that the more appropriate framework for the assessment of
their claims must center on a humanitarian ethic.  This ethic must include
a deeper understanding of the effect of extreme poverty on children; the
dearth of child welfare infrastructure in developing countries; and the
modern reality of families with mixed immigration status, with family
members residing inside and outside of the United States due to a broken
immigration system, attempting to reunify with their children.
The 2002 Homeland Security Act established the legal definition of
“unaccompanied alien child.”211  It also transferred responsibility for the
care of unaccompanied children from the former INS to the ORR estab-
lished by the 1980 Refugee Act, a move praised by child advocates because
ORR was viewed as a federal agency with “a social service mandate and a
background in serving foreign-born children outside the care of their par-
ents.”212  Also in 2002, the Child Status Protection Act amended immigra-
tion laws to prevent children from “aging out” of certain forms of relief
due to administrative delays.213  This meant that even if the relief sought
was not ultimately granted until the applicant children had exceeded the
statutory age limit, their age on the date of filing controlled regarding
their eligibility for the benefit, not the date relief was ultimately granted.
Despite regular resuscitations in Congress, the proposed Unaccompa-
nied Alien Child Protection Act, introduced by Senator Diane Feinstein,
failed several times between 2002 and 2007.214  The Act would have been
the most comprehensive piece of legislation to date regarding unaccompa-
nied minors.  It called for the appointment of child advocates to every
unaccompanied child in the care and custody of immigration officials and
contained provisions expanding access to counsel—calling for the place-
ment of children in locations where pro bono counsel were more likely to
211. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462(g)(2), 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (2002) (codi-
fied at 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012)).
212. See JACQUELINE BHABHA & MARY CROCK, SEEKING ASYLUM ALONE: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY 65 (2006).
213. See Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1151(f), 1153(h), 1154(k), 1158(b)(3), 1157(c)(2)(B) (2012)) (“An Act
to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to determine whether an alien is a
child, for purposes of classification as an immediate relative, based on the age of
the alien on the date the classification petition with respect to the alien is filed,
and for other purposes.”).
214. See, e.g., S. 844, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1129, 109th Cong. (2004); H.R.
3361, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 121, 107th Cong. (2001).
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be available.215  Passed by unanimous consent in the Senate in 2005, the
bill never passed through both houses despite overwhelming support from
government officials, including immigration officials and judges, who testi-
fied in a Senate hearing on the bill.216  In a post-9/11 Congress, the politi-
cal will to expand the rights of unaccompanied minors was lacking.
The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2008 (TVPRA), the most recent successful attempt to codify the
Flores settlement agreement, requires that, “within [forty-eight] hours of
[their] apprehension,” all unaccompanied children be screened as poten-
tial victims of human trafficking.217  The TVPRA also requires the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure “to the greatest
extent practicable” that unaccompanied children in HHS custody have
counsel, not only to “represent them in legal proceedings,” but to “protect
them from mistreatment, exploitation, and trafficking.”218  However, this
is no guarantee of representation, and the reality is that the vast majority
of these children remain unrepresented.
Additional protections under the TVPRA required that unaccompa-
nied children must be transferred by DHS to HHS custody within seventy-
two hours of apprehension.219  HHS is further required to “promptly
place[ ]” each child in its custody “in the least restrictive setting that is in
the best interests of the child.”220  Although this system has worked fairly
well for several years, under the stress of the recent waves of unaccompa-
nied minors at the southern border, the weaknesses turned into fail-
ures.221  As more and more failures are uncovered, Congress has been
compelled to investigate allegations that children were placed in homes in
the United States through this program “where they were sexually as-
saulted, starved or forced to work for little or no pay.”222  Once again,
legislative protections fell short without due process guarantees in place,
215. See S. 121 § 203(a)(4)(E) (“The Director shall develop standards for con-
ditions of detention in such placements that provide for . . . access to legal ser-
vices . . . .”); see also S. 844 § 103(a)(4)(A)(v); H.R. 3361 § 103(a)(4)(A)(v).
216. See Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act: Hearing on S. 121 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 7–11, 12–26,
31–49, 56–74 (2002).
217. See Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(a)(4), 122 Stat. 5044, 5076 (2008) (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(4) (2012)).
218. See id. § 235(c)(5), 122 Stat. at 5079 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232(e)(5)).
219. See id. § 235(b)(3), 122 Stat. at 5077 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232(b)(3)).
220. See id. § 235(c)(2), 122 Stat. at 5078 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232(c)(2)).
221. For a critique of this program, see Lauren R. Aronson, The Tipping Point:
The Failure of Form over Substance in Addressing the Needs of Unaccompanied Immigrant
Children, 18 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2015).
222. See Mary Clare Jalonick & Garance Burke, Senate Subcommittee Examines
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resulting in violations of the very same Flores agreement that the TVPRA
itself codified.
III. TODAY’S UNACCOMPANIED CHILD AND JUDICIAL REJECTION
OF THE FOUR FEARS
The children who arrived at the U.S.–Mexico border in the 2014
surge, and who continue to arrive in record numbers today, do not differ
from previous waves in terms of their motivations for fleeing.  A study of
the nearly 70,000 children who fled to the United States in fiscal year 2014
revealed that the majority of them came for three humanitarian-based rea-
sons: increased violence (primarily gang or cartel) in their home country,
“poverty, and [ ] reunification” with family members living in the United
States.223  What is different is their age and country of origin.  Today’s
unaccompanied immigrant child at the border is statistically much more
likely to be of Central or South American origin, male, and in his late
teens.224
The unique experiences of children at the southern border today are
symptomatic of what scholar Elizabeth Keyes calls the “sorting device” of
“worthiness” that functions as a proxy for race discrimination in modern
immigration law.225  We have not deemed them worthy of the most basic
223. See A Guide to Children Arriving at the Border, supra note 23, at 1–2 (“While
a child may have multiple reasons for leaving his or her country, children from the
Northern Triangle consistently cite gang or cartel violence as a primary motivation
for fleeing.”); see also Frances Robles, Fleeing Gangs, Children Head to U.S. Border, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/americas/flee-
ing-gangs-children-head-to-us-border.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/86DH-YKXH].
224. See Marc R. Rosenblum, Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States:
The Tension Between Protection and Prevention, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 3 (Apr. 2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migration-
united-states-tension-between-protection-and-prevention [https://perma.cc/
WWA3-K9VY] (explaining that minors from Northern Triangle account for over-
whelming majority of exponential growth in number of unaccompanied children
arriving at U.S.–Mexico border between FY 2011 and 2014).
225. Many scholars have named and documented numerous racist immigra-
tion laws and policies.  Immigration historians have identified race as an “ex-
plicit[ ]” factor in “admission and citizenship” as early as 1790. See DEIRDRE M.
MOLONEY, NATIONAL INSECURITIES 4 (2012) (“Race was used explicitly to define
eligibility for admission and citizenship in 1790, when eligibility for naturalization
or obtaining U.S. citizenship was denied to nonwhite immigrants.”); see also NGAI,
supra note 65, at 67 (“During the 1920s, immigration policy rearticulated the
U.S.–Mexico border as a cultural and racial boundary . . . .”); EDIBERTO ROMA´N,
THOSE DAMNED IMMIGRANTS: AMERICA’S HYSTERIA OVER UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRA-
TION 114, 120, 122–23 (2013); Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a Herna´ndez, La Migra in
the Mirror: Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 196 (2009) (“[N]aming the Border Patrol’s
emphasis on recruiting Mexican-descendant agents as a manifestation of internal-
ized oppression allows us to position this agency’s law enforcement strategy along-
side similar moments in human history . . . .”).  In an age where fewer immigration
policies are explicitly race-based, Professor Keyes has explored the particular idea
of “worthiness” as a modern proxy for racism in a number of contexts, most re-
cently with regard to the 2014 immigration reform efforts and specifically with
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protections of the Constitution, much less a path to safety through our
immigration laws.  And the popularity of anti-immigrant sentiment, specif-
ically anti-refugee sentiment, is again on the rise due to the fear-monger-
ing of President-Elect Donald J. Trump.226  Although history details
regular patterns of vitriolic sentiment towards unaccompanied children,
the intolerance suffered by children at the southern border today is
marked by extreme abuse and neglect by border officials.
These children survive what is typically a perilous journey227 to and
through the U.S.–Mexico border only to be subjected to inhumane treat-
ment by Customs and Border Patrol officers upon arrival.228  Reports tell
of children housed for extended periods of time at the border in tempo-
regard to certain child migrants. See Keyes, supra note 117 (discussing how narra-
tives addressing worthiness limit remedies available to immigrants in court); Eliza-
beth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship,
14 NEV. L.J. 101, 102–05 (2013) (examining tiers of worthiness among children
applying for relief under “Development, Relief, and Education for Minors Act”
(DREAM), which “put forward a strategy of citizenship based on worthiness—ele-
vating the best, the brightest, and the blameless—with costs both within the world
of immigration and outside it”); Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and
Now: How the Shift to “Worthiness” Undermines the 1965 Immigration Law’s Civil Rights
Goals, 57 HOWARD L.J. 899 (2014).
226. See, e.g., Ben Schreckinger, GOP Candidates Link Paris Attacks to Immigra-
tion, POLITICO (Nov. 15, 2015, 6:44 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/
11/paris-attacks-republicans-immigration-trump-cruz-215895 [https://perma.cc/
F766-WWXY]; Mollie Reilly, Republican Candidates Want to Block Syrian Refugees After
Paris Attacks, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2015, 3:42 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/entry/republicans-refugees-paris-attacks_us_564a1747e4b08cda3489da
73 [https://perma.cc/Z9EL-PBEZ]; Anthony Zurcher, Trump Leads Republican
“Bandwagon” Against Syrian Refugees, BBC (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-34884544 [https://perma.cc/EL5X-C3GQ]; see also Immigra-
tion, supra note 40.
227. Many children do not survive the border crossing, which often involves
dangerous modes of transportation, exploitation by “coyotes” (smugglers), and
grueling travel by foot through unforgiving desert terrain and heat. See MARGARET
REGAN, THE DEATH OF JOSSELINE: IMMIGRATION STORIES FROM THE ARIZONA BORDER-
LANDS (2010) (detailing horrific deaths of children attempting to migrate through
southern border); see also Wilson Sayre, Riding “the Beast” Across Mexico to the U.S.
Border, NPR (June 5, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/
2014/06/05/318905712/riding-the-beast-across-mexico-to-the-u-s-border [https://
perma.cc/2G9B-8ZQ6].
228. Children who arrived with their parents in this surge were subjected to
similar abuses.  Many of them remain in newly-created family detention facilities,
which have historically failed to meaningfully address the needs of migrant chil-
dren and families. See Halfway Home, supra note 8, at 11.  Recent CBP abuses
against children detained in the Tucson sector are detailed in a lawsuit filed by
advocacy groups led by the American Immigration Counsel. See Complaint, Doe v.
Johnson, No. No. 4:15-cv-00250-DCB, 2015 WL 3619102 [hereinafter Doe v. Johnson
Complaint].  I use the terms “Customs and Border Patrol” and “Border Patrol”
throughout this essay to refer to both the border enforcement agents that histori-
cally were charged with the duties now assigned to the CBP as well as the specific
bureaucratic sub-agency of DHS, written into existence through the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101, 116 Stat. 2135, 2142 (2002)
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2012)).
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rary detention facilities that resemble dog kennels.229  Others are de-
tained in extremely harsh conditions, such as the well-documented
“hielera” or “ice box:” a freezing cold cell without a bed or blanket in which
the “lights are kept on [twenty-four] hours a day,” depriving children
(some of them infants) of developmentally-critical sleep.230  In some
cases, children are physically and sexually abused by CBP officers, asked to
make admissions about legally significant facts surrounding their entry to
the United States without a right to an attorney, and otherwise dis-
empowered and subordinated by government officials.231  As one young
girl recounted, “[w]e were so cold all the time . . . .  I thought of the
[United States] as a country where human rights are respected, especially
of children.  I thought of it as a place of freedom, full of sunlight, where
you’d feel the wind like you were outside.”232  Children are held in these
conditions under color of law with exceptionally limited due process
rights233 and very little information about when they can expect to be re-
leased.  “[One male detainee] apprehended near the McAllen, Texas, bor-
der was threatened with rape by a CBP official . . . .  He was subsequently
229. See Michael Kiefer, Immigrant Kids Detained in Warehouse of Humanity, USA
TODAY (June 18, 2014, 8:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/06/18/immigrant-children-detention-centers/10798643/ [https://perma
.cc/LQ27-BR38] (noting detainees “sit in fenced off areas or lie on mattresses
placed [ ] up against the other with a look of intense boredom on their faces”).
230. See Ed Pilkington, “It Was Cold, Very Cold”: Migrant Children Endure Border
Patrol “Ice Boxes”, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/jan/26/migrant-children-border-patrol-ice-boxes [https://
perma.cc/RY53-WU8W].
231. See generally Letter from Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr., supra note 8 (filing
complaint on behalf of 116 unaccompanied immigrant children and urging DHS
to “conduct a prompt and thorough investigation into each of these allegations”);
see also James Lyall, “Welcome to Hell”: The Border Patrol’s Repeated Abuse of Children,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2014, 10:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
james-lyall/welcome-to-hell-the-borde_b_5527967.html [https://perma.cc/XG5E-
XBNV].
232. Pilkington, supra note 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Tatiana
(a pseudonym) was detained in a temporary immigration detention facility at the
U.S.–Mexico border, along with her nine-month-old baby, for ten days, and a re-
cent report details the conditions of her civil confinement:
There was no bedding, not even a blanket, and she slept fitfully with Raf-
ael in her arms.  After a few days the baby caught a cold and stopped
eating solids, and for a couple of days he wouldn’t even take his mother’s
milk.  His weight fell from 23lbs when he arrived at the border station to
15lbs.  She said she didn’t ask for medical treatment for her son because
of an incident she had witnessed involving another mother in the holding
cell.  The other woman had asked a guard for help with her infant child
who was suffering from the cold, and the guard replied: “Why do you
come here if you don’t like it?  You should go back home.”
Id.
233. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 203, at
5–6 (documenting inadequate detention conditions of unaccompanied alien chil-
dren and other immigrant minors, including restriction of “access to legal repre-
sentation”).  Conditions have not improved significantly since this report was
issued.
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strip-searched and made to stand naked for 15 minutes while a different
CBP official patted him down . . . .  His crime?  The officials didn’t believe
he was 16 years old.”234  These children endure state-sponsored punish-
ment typically reserved for the most detested, most reviled criminals and
terrorists prosecuted under the laws of the United States.235  They endure
what they fled to avoid.  At the peak of the crisis in 2014, the government’s
response was officially, “we will send you back.”236
As a result, very little has changed in official policy at the border,
which has led to mounting lawsuits filed by the same groups who blazed
the trail against these types of conditions and in defense of due process for
unaccompanied minors in Orantes and Perez-Funez.  In at least one of these
cases, the government is dusting off the Four Fears and bringing them
back to match the political rhetoric of the election year.  However, the
judiciary is pushing back.  The first of these complaints was at the height
of the crisis in June 2014.  Filed against the Department of Homeland Se-
curity by the American Civil Liberties Union along with a number of other
legal advocacy organizations, the complaint details the abuses of unaccom-
panied minors at the border, and includes first-hand accounts of abuse
from the children themselves.237  The complaint calls upon DHS to imple-
ment a number of policies consistent with the Flores settlement agreement
and makes a number of recommendations regarding how to curb the
abuses.238  Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the same group of
organizations filed a lawsuit challenging the Obama administration’s fam-
ily-detention policies.239
234. Lyall, supra note 228.
235. See generally Stella Burch Elias, Rethinking “Preventive Detention” from a Com-
parative Perspective: Three Frameworks for Detaining Terrorist Suspects, 41 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 99 (2009) (comparing and contrasting different forms of preventive
detention for terror suspects with immigration detention and noting use of immi-
gration detention in some cases of migrant terror suspects as “proxy . . . for preven-
tive detention”).
236. See Hearing Reviewing the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Unac-
companied Children and Related Matters Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th
Cong. (2014) (statement of Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. of the United
States), available at http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/download/2014/07/
10/secretary-johnson-testimony [https://perma.cc/57QP-2K58].
237. See Letter from Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr., supra note 8, at 7–18.  Note
that just after this complaint was filed, the ACLU was barred from visiting its clients
and the lawyers had to file an injunction under Orantes in order to see their clients.
See Federal Court Orders Department of Homeland Security to Allow Class Action Lawyers to
Meet with Children Fleeing Violence, supra note 178.
238. See Letter from Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr., supra note 8, at 22–24.
239. See R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015); see also ACLU
Sues Obama Administration for Detaining Asylum Seekers as Intimidation Tactic, ACLU
(Dec. 16, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-sues-obama-adminis-
tration-detaining-asylum-seekers-intimidation-tactic [https://perma.cc/6BN4-
JEJS] (announcing ACLU filed nationwide class action challenging Obama admin-
istration “on behalf of mothers and children who have fled extreme violence,
death threats, rape, and persecution in Central America”).  The outcomes of the
family detention are not squarely on point for the purpose of this paper, but may
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A. Doe v. Johnson
The American Immigration Council and others recently filed suit
against officials in the Tucson, Arizona, Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol,
where some of the worst abuses of unaccompanied minors have oc-
curred.240  The claims asserted in the complaint involve numerous Fifth
Amendment Due Process violations as well as a violation of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.241  As to this latter claim, Plaintiffs allege that bor-
der patrol officers failed to uphold their own official policies regarding
the detention of unaccompanied minors and Flores compliance and, in
spite of their awareness of the “unhealthy” and punitive conditions, “failed
to take remedial action.”242  Over the course of the litigation thus far, the
court has issued sanctions against the government for the destruction of
some of the potentially most damaging evidence, including thousands of
hours of video from inside the facilities.243
The case raises important questions about the standards owed to un-
accompanied minors in civil immigration detention.  Importantly, in rul-
ing against the government’s Motion to Dismiss, the court cited the
leading case on civil detention standards, which provides that civilly-de-
tained individuals are entitled to due process protections “at least as great
as those afforded to an individual accused but not convicted of a
crime . . . .  cannot be subjected to conditions that amount to punish-
ment.”244  As will be discussed in Part IV, this standard has played a central
role in pending litigation regarding a host of issues for undocumented
immigrant children.
have implications for other pending suits concerning the rights of similarly de-
tained unaccompanied children.
240. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, Challenging Unconstitutional Conditions in CBP
Detention Facilities (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litiga-
tion/challenging-unconstitutional-conditions-cbp-detention-facilities [https://per
ma.cc/R9RC-H9R9] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (describing mistreatment of de-
tainees at Tucson Border Patrol Stations).
241. See generally Doe v. Johnson Complaint, supra note 228.  The court has dis-
missed the claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, but the claims under
the Fifth Amendment remain. See Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doe v.
Johnson, No. CV 15-00250-TUC-DCB (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2016), available at https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/litigation_documents/
118_order_on_mtd.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F9E-MY6W].
242. See Doe v. Johnson Complaint, supra note 228, at 34–42.
243. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants




244. See Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 238, at 5–6
(quoting Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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B. Flores v. Johnson
Predictably, it is the most recent resurrection of the Flores case that is
stirring up the usual fear-based narratives.  Filed in February 2015, this suit
challenges the blanket no-release policy enacted by DHS, in which the
government detained “all female-headed families, including children, in
secure, unlicensed facilities for howsoever long as it takes to determine
whether they are entitled to remain in the U.S.”245  The complaint alleges
that this policy violates provisions of the Flores agreement that require im-
migration authorities to “release a minor from its custody without unnec-
essary delay” and to make “prompt and continuous efforts on its part
toward family reunification and release of the minor.”246  In her initial
ruling on the case, ordering the prompt release of children from family
detention centers, the judge articulated what has been on the minds of
advocates for years:
It is astonishing that Defendants have enacted a policy requiring
such expensive infrastructure without more evidence to show
that it would be compliant with an Agreement that has been in
effect for nearly [twenty] years . . . .  It is even more shocking that
after nearly two decades Defendants have not implemented appro-
priate regulations to deal with this complicated area of immigra-
tion law.247
The judge then specifically refuted the fear-based claims that the gov-
ernment asserted in defense of its policy:
Defendants state that “the proposed remedies could heighten
the risk of another surge in illegal migration across our South-
west border by Central American families, including by incen-
tivizing adults to bring children with them on their dangerous
journey as a means to avoid detention and gain access to the inte-
rior of the United States.” This statement is speculative at best, and,
at worse, fear-mongering.248
This is a rare example of the judiciary explicitly rejecting the use of
the floodgates fear in opposition to the migration of unaccompanied mi-
nors.  Although the Judge’s ruling was subsequently limited on appeal to
apply to children only and not their parents, the decision on appeal clari-
245. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement
of Class Action at 2, Flores v. Johnson, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2,
2015).
246. See id. at 6, 9.
247. Order Re Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement of Class Action and
Defendants’ Motion to Amend Settlement Agreement at 23–24, Flores v. Johnson,
CV 85-4544 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015).
248. Order Re Response to Order to Show Cause at 11, Flores v. Lynch, No.
CV 85-04544 DMG (Ex) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), 2015 WL 9915880, at *6 (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted).
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fied that the Flores agreement applies to both accompanied and unaccom-
panied minors.249  With a number of similar cases pending, the judiciary
has a number of opportunities to publicly denounce the fear-based narra-
tives and re-examine its role in checking the unbalanced power of the
executive in the administration of immigration law and policy.
C. Private Harms, Public Concern: Government Culpability
Apart from lawsuits against the government, litigation against private
individuals responsible for the abuse and exploitation of unaccompanied
minors resettling in the United States has given rise to increased scrutiny
of HHS by concerned legislators.  A ring of human traffickers with whom
HHS had placed a number of unaccompanied children were federally in-
dicted for forcing the children to work six or seven days per week, twelve
hours per day on egg farms in and around Marion, Ohio.250
This indictment prompted the Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations in the U.S. Senate to conduct an investigation and a series of hear-
ings on the matter.251  The staff report, compiled as a part of the
investigation, constitutes official governmental recognition of these re-
peated failures to identify, receive, process, place, and monitor unaccom-
panied minors admitted to the United States.252  The report concludes by
stating that ORR has undertaken the long-awaited process of codifying rel-
evant TVPRA provisions, as well as some of the placement protections of
the Flores settlement, which advocates would say has been a long time com-
ing.253  It remains to be seen whether ORR will finish this project, and
even if it does, without parallel scrutiny of the practices of Customs and
Border Patrol, the project’s impact on the treatment of unaccompanied
minors at the U.S.–Mexico border will be limited.  However, attempts to
codify the protections developed for these children over the years, and the
willingness of the government to formally re-examine its policies and prac-
tices to curb abuses by private actors, represent a normative shift toward
accepting some responsibility for harms unaccompanied children have
suffered and acknowledging the constitutional rights owed to them.
249. See Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016).
250. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Castillo-Serrano, No. 3:15-
cr-00024 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2015), ECF No. 28.
251. See S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 114TH CONG., REP. ON PROTECTING
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN FROM TRAFFICKING AND OTHER ABUSES: THE ROLE
OF THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Jan. 28, 2016).
252. The Subcommittee did not take up the issue of unaccompanied minors
abused by Border Patrol officers, but did assign responsibility for the placements of
children with abusive sponsors to HHS and the Office for Refugee Resettlement.
See id.
253. See id. at 51 (quoting Implementation of the Unaccompanied Alien Children
(UAC) Provisions of the Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2008, OFFICE OF INFO.
& REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=2015
10&RIN=0970-AC42 [https://perma.cc/JD2Q-RVJT] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016)).
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IV. TRANSFORMATIVE PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND THE ANTIDOTE
TO THE FOUR FEARS
Applying a dispute-transformation framework to the treatment of un-
accompanied minors in immigration law and, specifically at the
U.S.–Mexico border, suggests that the last forty years of litigation have
only begun to scratch the surface of rectifying the suffering of these chil-
dren in the last century since the creation of the Border Patrol.254  It also
suggests that further study of the fear-based oppositions to their arrival,
anchored in centuries of systemic subordination of their rights, is central
to identifying the depth of the problem and crafting the appropriate due
process remedy.255  The antidote to the Four Fears is strategic, targeted,
and coordinated public law litigation that balances the interests protected
by securing due process remedies for children with more salient govern-
ment interests stripped of the illegitimacy of the Four Fears.  The courts
are uniquely positioned to take a stand in opposition to the Four Fears
and further, to identify a ceiling, rather than a floor, for due process owed
to unaccompanied minors.
The three-factor balancing test for procedural due process protec-
tions articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews and applied to the case
of unaccompanied immigrant children in Perez-Funez has emerged as a
central unifying theme in pending cases.  Applying Mathews, courts are
balancing (1) “the private interest affected”; (2) “the risk of erroneous
deprivation of rights . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional . . .
safeguards”; and (3) “the government’s interest.”256  In the decades that
have followed the Perez-Funez decision, the increasingly criminal nature of
the proceedings against these children, the gravity of the potential out-
come (systemic and pervasive abuse and neglect, resulting in death in
some cases) paired with the complete inability of the Border Patrol to self-
police unlimited and unchecked discretion afforded to its agents, and pol-
icy considerations set forth the strongest arguments for expanding proce-
dural due process protections.257
254. For a discussion of the legal framework guidine disputes more generally,
see William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Nam-
ing, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981).  “Formal litigation and
even disputing within unofficial fora account for a tiny fraction of the antecedent
events that could mature into disputes.” Id.
255. See id. (“Moreover, what happens at earlier stages determines both the
quantity and the contents of the caseload of formal and informal legal institutions.
Transformation studies spotlight the issue of conflict levels in American society
and permit exploration of the question of whether these levels are too low.”).
256. See Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 619 F. Supp. 656, 659 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (articulating “three-
part balancing test for the resolution of procedural due process issues”).
257. In fact, the Mathews factors were cited extensively and centrally in a very
recent brief submitted in support of a class action regarding children’s right to
appointed counsel in immigration proceedings. See Brief of the Amicus States of
Washington and California, J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, No. 2:14-cv-01026-TSZ (9th Cir. Mar.
11, 2016).
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A. The Militarization of the U.S.–Mexico Border Supports the Case for
Expanded Due Process Rights for Unaccompanied Children
In the years since the Orantes and Perez-Funez injunctions were initially
entered, the relationship between Border Patrol and unaccompanied chil-
dren at the U.S.–Mexico border has increasingly resembled that of law
enforcement and criminals.  Throughout the second half of the twentieth
century, and accelerating until the end of its last decade, layers of expo-
nentially more restrictive immigration policy and practice at the Border
would both create “illegal immigration” and criminalize acts that are “civil
in nature.”258  The 1990s witnessed a “stunning militarization of the
U.S.–Mexico border” with Congress authorizing “a doubling of the Border
Patrol’s force, the erection of fences and walls, and the deployment of all
manner of high-tech surveillance on land and by air.”259  After the Sep-
tember 11th terrorist attacks in 2001, Congress further limited the ability
of courts to review the quasi-legal discretionary decisions of CBP officers,
so long as the decisions were related to deportation and removal.260
In other words, if the officers err on the side of exclusion, their deci-
sions are not subject to review, despite evidence of abuse of discretion or
even physical abuse of the excluded individual.261  The national dialogue
also shifted to a greater focus on border security and immigration enforce-
ment at the expense of humanitarian concerns at the southern border.262
The United States today spends more money each year on bor-
der and immigration enforcement than the combined budgets of
the FBI, ATF, DEA, Secret Service and U.S. Marshals—plus the
258. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472, 527 (2007)
(“[I]mmigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and
priorities of the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudica-
tion model in favor of a civil regulatory regime.”); see also CHOMSKY, supra note 80;
NGAI, supra note 65, at 248.
259. See NGAI, supra note 65, at 266.
260. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, §§ 201–225, 412, 115 Stat. 272, 278–96, 350–52; Quinn H. Vanden-
berg, Note, How Can the United States Rectify Its Post-9/11 Stance on Noncitizens’
Rights?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 605, 615 n.50 (2004) (“[W]ith
the USA PATRIOT Act, immigrants’ rights to judicial review are practically zero.”).
261. See David B. Pakula & Lawrence P. Lataif, Judicial Review of Administrative
Immigration Decisions: Can the Doctrine of “Ejusdem Generis” Save It from Extinction?, 78
FLA. B.J., Jan. 2004, at 32, 34 (stating that INA Section 242(a)(2)(B) is Act’s “most
controversial jurisdiction-limiting provision” in that it provides “no court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . . statutory forms of relief that can be raised both before
commencement of removal proceedings and during removal proceedings[,]”
namely “waivers of inadmissibility, voluntary departure, adjustment of status and
asylum,” as well as “cancellation of removal” (footnotes omitted)).
262. See Chaco´n, supra note 6, at 93 (“The term border security as it is currently
used in the national discourse is a post-9/11 phenomenon.  In fact, the term that
we have come to view as synonymous with immigration issues has only been a part
of this discourse for the last seven years or so.”).
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entire NYPD annual budget.  Altogether, the country has in-
vested more than $100 billion in border and immigration control
since 9/11.263
The “construction of illegality” that now shrouds unaccompanied
children at the border has been identified by social scientists as “a form of
state violence[ ] [because] it individualizes the actions of the children and
disavows a series of dependencies as well as the independencies of the
travel, transnational familial contexts, isolation, and communities.”264  La-
beling otherwise law-abiding unaccompanied children with this construc-
tion of illegality also changes the baseline of a Border Patrol officer’s
intuitive perception.  When Border Patrol officers are trained to view all
unauthorized immigrants as potential criminals, their discretion is im-
paired.  Recent psychological scholarship provides an explanation of how
this happens.  Essentially, the cognitive mental anchor for the population
with which immigration authorities regularly interact is firmly planted in
anti-immigrant bias, which then competes with any other information that
they process from their interactions with the children themselves (such as
innocence, humanitarian concerns, and dependency) that would counter
such an implicit bias.265  In addition, such anchoring acts to establish a
baseline for confirmation bias—the process by which the brain seeks out
information to confirm what one already knows to be true, which com-
petes with the more critically analytic cognitive processing, particularly
when wrestling with ethical dilemmas.266  The criminalization of unac-
companied children thus has a more insidious, systemic, and psychologi-
cal impact on children and border patrol alike, felt on an even deeper
emotional level than the inhumane punitive processes and conditions.267
263. Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America’s
Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO MAG. (Nov./Dec. 2014), http:/
/www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-
112220#.Vda23U2FNdh [https://perma.cc/3MUH-J694].
264. See Aitken et al., supra note 13, at 234.
265. See Keyes, supra note 117, at 238–39 (discussing specific ways in which
anti-immigrant narratives act as psychological anchors in legal decision-making
process).
266. For an accessible and rigorous overview of the psychological models ex-
plaining this phenomenon, which has been proven through brain science, see
Mark D. Rogerson et al., Nonrational Processes in Ethical Decision Making, 66 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 614, 622 (2011) (“Emotions and values exert their powerful influence
through automatic and intuitive processes.  Acknowledging and understanding the
resulting tendencies and biases represent a promising path to a more realistic,
accurate, and helpful conceptualization of decision making, particularly in emo-
tionally charged situations.”); see also generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST
AND SLOW (2011) (explaining concepts of anchoring, cognitive bias, and confirma-
tion bias in every day decision-making, both personal and professional).
267. See Jorge M. Chavez et al., Sufren Los Nin˜os: Exploring the Impact of Unautho-
rized Immigration Status on Children’s Well-Being, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 638, 642–47
(2012); Irene Scharf & Christine Hess, What Process Is Due? Unaccompanied Minors’
Rights to Deportation Hearings, 1988 DUKE L.J. 114, 114 n.2 (noting restrictions on
telephone use “exacerbated” impact on young unaccompanied children).
56
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss5/3
2016] THE POLITICS OF FEAR 899
1. The Effects of Border Patrol Militarization on Unaccompanied Children
The circumstances of unaccompanied minors at the border are arche-
typical illustrations of the moral dilemmas presented by the existence of
borders generally.  “[B]orders are today considered to be active zones of
negotiation, exchange and creation, impacting not only people’s physical
worlds and mobility but also their symbolic worlds and notions of belong-
ing.”268  Borders are functions of political dynamics in which the individu-
als who are affected by them have no agency or influence.  Children,
specifically, face immeasurable challenges in negotiating borders, which
are not typically the type of legal distinctions that they have the sophisti-
cated knowledge base to recognize or understand.  And yet, children are
also deeply impacted by border policies in terms of their internal orienta-
tion to the world around them and the limitations that borders place on
their access to safe places in the world.
Border zones are places that force governments to answer questions
regarding security, freedom, gatekeeping, and belonging.  They are also
places where there are few protections from the government’s abuses.
The unchecked discretion afforded to government agents in appre-
hending undocumented immigrants, including unaccompanied children,
allows for rampant heuristic stereotyping and biases to play a central role
in race-based exclusions.  And as the law attempts to navigate these issues,
the ever-watchful eye of due process interrogates the expediency, effi-
ciency, deliberativeness, and fairness of the result.  The lens of due process
of law serves a different purpose than that of sociological, historical, or
ethnographic examinations.  It reveals the level of mistreatment of a per-
son that a society and its government are willing to tolerate in order to
pursue interests that are, by definition, located in a higher order of prior-
ity than individual rights and freedoms.  The apprehension of unaccompa-
nied children at the border place CBP squarely, albeit reluctantly, in the
role of temporary custodian.  The questions forced by this situation pre-
sent difficult issues.  How much do we value the lives and well-being of
children?  On what basis are we differentiating between the rights af-
forded those children whose only infraction is the violation of a civil–legal
construct of “border” versus children who are alleged to have committed a
crime?  To what level of custodial integrity do we hold the government as
temporary caregivers to these children?
Certainly, these questions are implicated in many other contexts in
U.S. law, and this paper is not intended to address them.  What is interest-
ing in this examination, however, is that the lack of official oversight at the
border has allowed Border Patrol practices to unfold, resulting in these
questions being answered to the detriment of children.  In part by design
and in part by customary practice, the Border Patrol does not have the
authority to police its own force.  As documented by investigative journal-
ist Garrett Graff:
268. CHILDREN AND BORDERS 9 (Spyros Syrou & Miranda Christou eds., 2014).
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When DHS was set up, ICE was given exclusive “1811 authority”
to conduct investigations in the border region; CBP was only
given so-called “1801 authority,” a lesser classification that al-
lowed Border Patrol agents and Customs officers to make arrests
and enforce federal law—but not investigate. They could be cops
but not detectives.
That didn’t particularly matter in the daily performance of
CBP’s duties—the borders were patrolled, the ports of entry
watched—except that CBP was legally prohibited from policing
its own workforce.269
Graff goes on to detail how these disparate authorities, which are ac-
tually just human resources codes created and used by the Office for Per-
sonnel Management (OPM) to classify different types of federal jobs,270
result in escalating tensions between Border Patrol leadership, the DHS,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).271  In the face of rising
death tolls of children both inside and outside the border zone at the
hands of Border Patrol agents,272 attempts by CBP leadership to establish
an internal affairs unit were quashed by their own host agency—DHS.273
And when they “turned to the FBI for investigative help” internally, DHS
“cut of all [ ] cooperation” with the FBI’s Border Corruption Task
269. Graff, supra note 260.
270. The Classification Act of 1949 established this classification standards
program. See 5 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012).  The Act provides, among other things, that
the Office for Personnel Management is responsible for establishing standards and
working with various government agencies to determine the appropriate standard
for each position of employment. See 5 U.S.C. § 5103.  Individuals can challenge
their classification and those of their subordinates through an appellate process.
See 5 U.S.C. § 5112(b).  A cursory study of the appellate opinions, which are han-
dled internally by OPM, contains fascinating contortions of logic to deny this very
shift in classification. See, e.g., OPM Decision GS-1801-12, No. C-1801-12-05 (1999).
The decision found that, although the “first duty” of the appellant’s job descrip-
tion involved “identifying those in criminal institutions who have violated immigra-
tion laws and are subject to deportation” and “managing the process of identifying,
interviewing, and processing criminal aliens,” and even though the basis for the
appeal was that the position description “has not properly taken into account the
recent changes in law relating to removal of criminal aliens,” such changes requir-
ing “a higher level of knowledge of the Immigration Agents to perform their du-
ties,” the work of the appellant and his staff nevertheless did not require
“knowledge of investigative techniques and a knowledge of the laws of evidence,
the rules of criminal procedure, and precedent court decisions concerning admis-
sibility of evidence, constitutional rights, search and seizure, and related issues” to
justify the higher classification. See id.
271. See Graff, supra note 260.
272. Several recent cases highlight the shooting deaths of unaccompanied im-
migrant children at the U.S.–Mexico border by Border Patrol agents, including
one in which the Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 84 U.S.L.W. 3060 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016); Perez v. United States,
103 F. Supp. 3d 1180 (S.D. Cal. 2015).
273. See Graff, supra note 260.
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Forces.274  The discrepancy persists today.  A bureaucratic, administrative
labeling system that dates back to the 1940s, the most turbulent and re-
strictionist time in the history of American immigration law and policy, is
preventing CBP from establishing any meaningful self-regulation
mechanism.
The normative impact of this hamstringing of Border Patrol leader-
ship at the top is revealed in the persistence of abusive and coercive tactics
of Border Patrol boots on the ground.  The failure of the U.S. govern-
ment, Congress, and courts to adequately address and curb known, docu-
mented abuses by Border Patrol agents reveals that some of the most
vulnerable humans in their care are so far subordinated in the legal order
such that their abuse and death are inconsequential to the countervailing
import of insulating the government from liability.
B. Promising Litigation: The Right to Appointed Counsel in Immigration
Proceedings and the Irony of the Delinquent Immigrant Child
Unaccompanied immigrant children are not provided with appointed
counsel for deportation hearings at the government’s expense.275  A sepa-
rate but related issue is that children are likewise not afforded counsel
while in government custody at the border.  However, the availability of a
lawyer can dramatically improve outcomes for children facing deporta-
tion.  A recent study revealed that unaccompanied children represented
by counsel in immigration court were permitted to stay in the United
States 73% of the time, compared with only 15% when the child appeared
without representation.276  The “probable value” of the presence of coun-
sel is clear.  Because many of the government abuses of children at the
southern border involve securing waivers of rights—including access to
counsel and the right to a hearing, obtaining consents to voluntary depar-
ture under duress, and longer delays between apprehension and a hearing
274. See id.
275. Many scholars, litigators and activists are working on this issue, and their
work will be the subject of future scholarly articles on this subject.  I raise it here to
acknowledge the critical mass that is gelling around this issue in particular, not to
offer an extensive descriptive treatment of the exceptional litigation that is cur-
rently being handled by “the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Immi-
gration Council, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Public Counsel, and
K&L Gates LLP.” See Kristin Macleod-Ball, Judge Who Believes Toddlers Can Represent
Themselves, Only Part of the Problem in the Battle over Representation for Kids, AM. IM-
MIGR. COUNCIL: IMMIGR. IMPACT (Mar. 9, 2016), http://immigrationimpact.com/
2016/03/09/judge-believes-toddlers-can-represent-part-problem-battle-representa-
tion-kids/ [https://perma.cc/J3N5-YVEZ] (noting counsel involved in immigra-
tion proceedings).
276. See Representation for Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Court, TRAC
IMMIGR. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/371/ [https://
perma.cc/T2JD-RWKU].
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on deportability—the “risk of erroneous deprivation of rights” is high.277
With the “private interests” affected being life and liberty, the only remain-
ing factor is the government’s interest.  Although the burden on the gov-
ernment is unknown, guaranteeing access to counsel to unaccompanied
children at the border is the minimum standard owed; providing them
with appointed counsel when removal proceedings are initiated against
them, even at the border, is constitutionally sound.
In the earliest cases addressing this issue, the Ninth Circuit held that,
because immigration proceedings were civil in nature, the criminal right
to counsel was inapplicable.278  This distinction has since been turned on
its head by the Ninth Circuit.279  And although the Court in Perez-Funez
declined to extend the right to government-appointed counsel to de-
tained children, there is a substantial amount of dicta that supports such a
finding.280  In fact, after engaging in the balancing test, the Perez-Funez
Court found that, “[u]nder the circumstances presented in th[e] case, le-
gal counsel certainly would be the best insurance against a deprivation of
rights.”281  However, where the court fell short was in its decision that a
phone call to “a parent, close adult relative, or adult friend . . . put[s] the
child on more equal footing with the INS.”282  The last several decades
have proven the Perez-Funez court wrong on this point, and increasingly,
courts are not only entertaining the notion of the right to counsel for
immigration proceedings, but paving the way.
In recent years, some courts have upheld the right of immigrant chil-
dren to representation and other rights when they are alleged to have
277. See Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 619 F. Supp. 656, 659 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (discussing three-part
balancing test).
278. See Murgia-Melendrez v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407
F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1969) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution.” (citing Woodby v. Immigra-
tion Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S.Ct. 54, 68 L.Ed.
221 (1923); Diric v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 400 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1968)).
279. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e instruct the dis-
trict court on remand to appoint counsel to assist Jones in pursuing his case.”).
For a further discussion of Blanas, see supra notes 234–37 and accompanying text.
280. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (“With respect to the waiver by the
Juvenile Court to the adult court . . . we said that ‘there is no place in our system of
law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony—
without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of rea-
sons.’” (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966))); Aguilera-Enri-
quez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 516 F.2d 565, 568 & n.3 (6th Cir.
1975) (“The test for whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for
an indigent alien is whether, in a given case, the assistance of counsel would be
necessary to provide ‘fundamental fairness the touchstone of due process.’” (citing
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973))).
281. See Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 619 F. Supp. 656, 665 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
282. See id. (footnote omitted) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115 (1982)).
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committed a crime at the border under the Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act (JDA) of 1974, which identifies core protections
afforded to minors in federal custody.283  These core protections include
that the arresting officer “must immediately advise the juvenile of his or
her rights; immediately advise the juvenile’s parents, guardian, or custo-
dian of the juvenile’s rights; comply with any request by the juvenile to
speak with his or her parents or a parental surrogate; and bring the juve-
nile before a magistrate judge ‘forthwith.’”284
Note that the triggering event is the taking of the child into federal
custody, not that the hearings are criminal in nature.  The Ninth Circuit
has gone so far as to state that in the civil commitment context, the due
process protections should be “at least as great as those afforded to an
individual accused but not convicted of a crime.”285  This leading civil de-
tention standard is increasingly entrenched in the litigation concerning
the due process floor for detention conditions for unaccompanied minors
at the border, but has not yet been extended to the right to counsel.286  A
class action in the 9th Circuit, where the Mathews factors are taking center
stage, is making great strides towards articulating both a jurisprudential
and a statutory basis for appointing counsel to unaccompanied minors fac-
ing removal in immigration courts.287 J.E. F.M. v. Lynch (formerly J.E.
F.M. v. Holder) recently received a boon of publicity when it was revealed
that an immigration judge who was deposed in the case asserted that he
“had [ ] taught immigration law to toddlers” who “represent themselves in
immigration court.”288
Like immigration proceedings, juvenile delinquency proceedings are
often not considered criminal in nature, and the punishment does not
count as a “criminal conviction” under immigration law.289  But the admis-
sions made in a juvenile delinquency hearing can have lingering “immi-
gration consequences,” including the establishment of the factual
predicate for exclusion.290  Looking at a few recent cases, the irony is that
it may be advantageous for unaccompanied children to commit a crime
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012) (“A juvenile alleged to have committed an
act of juvenile delinquency . . . shall not be preceded against . . . .”).
284. See United States v. C.M., 485 F.3d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing
18 U.S.C. §  5033).
285. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004).
286. For further discussion on this point, see supra notes 234–37 and accom-
panying text.
287. See J.E. F.M. v. Lynch, Nos. 15-35738, 15-35739, 2016 WL 5030344 (9th
Cir. Sept. 17, 2015), sub nom, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash.
2014).
288. See Macleod-Ball, supra note 272.
289. See In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362, 1373 (B.I.A. 2000) (reaf-
firming that “juvenile delinquencies are not considered to be crimes within the
meaning of the immigration laws and charges relating to the conviction of or the
admission of the commission of crimes are inapplicable in such cases”).
290. See Theo Liebmann, Adverse Consequences and Constructive Opportunities for
Immigrant Youth in Delinquency Proceedings, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 870–74 (2016).
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insignificant enough to avoid admissibility issues, but significant enough
to trigger the right to counsel.
In one case, a juvenile plaintiff who was “a Mexican national[ ] ap-
proached [a] border patrol checkpoint” in California.291  Instead of wait-
ing to be flagged on after questioning, the plaintiff kept driving and his
tires were flattened.292  After being held for approximately six hours, the
plaintiff was read his Miranda rights in Spanish.293  The agents “did not
attempt to contact [the plaintiff’s] uncles” or the consulate, and the plain-
tiff “ultimately gave a sworn statement incriminating himself.”294  Further-
more, plaintiff was held for eleven hours prior to his first appearance in
front of a magistrate judge.295  The court held that the plaintiff “was de-
prived of his rights . . . to immediate notification and prompt arraignment,
and to the advice and counsel of a responsible adult prior to interroga-
tion” in violation of the JDA, and the charges against him were
dismissed.296
Another successful case did not result in a finding of a due process
violation, but it did result in the suppression of a statement against interest
secured from a fifteen-year-old plaintiff “detained at the border” for trans-
porting cocaine from Mexico to the United States.297  These few cases do
not address squarely the issue of government-provided counsel for immi-
gration proceedings, but they serve as potential precedent for future argu-
ments that unaccompanied children in the custody of the federal border
patrol are entitled to representation, especially when detention conditions
equate to punishment.  The right should attach irrespective of whether
they are being held for a civil violation of the immigration laws or allega-
tions of criminal activity, because in either case, the potential penalty is
severe enough to warrant it.298
291. See United States v. C.M., 485 F.3d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 2007).
292. See id. (“[The plaintiff] proceeded forward without having been visibly
flagged on.  The officer yelled for deployment of a ‘spike mat,’ which flattened the
tires on the vehicle and brought it to a rest about a half-mile from the
checkpoint.”).
293. See id. at 497 (noting agents “ignored” plaintiff’s request to speak to Mex-
ican consulate after receiving Miranda warning).
294. See id. (noting agents used plaintiff’s “statements to support a juvenile
information”).
295. See id. at 502–03 (“The record indicates that C.M. was processed between
5 and 6:30 a.m., interrogated between 11 a.m. and about 1 p.m. . . . . The four to
five hours that it took to conduct these tasks do not explain why eleven hours
elapsed before C.M. was arraigned.”).
296. See id. at 505.
297. See United States v. D.L., 453 F.3d 1115, 1115, 1120–25, 1127 (9th Cir.
2006).  The court indicated that the plaintiff was not a U.S. citizen, the vehicle that
the plaintiff was driving alone had Mexican license plates, and when officials in-
quired about his family members, he stated that they lived in Mexico. See id. at
1117–18 (describing plaintiff and noting “he was not a United States citizen”).  It is
conceivable that the subject child was, in fact, an unaccompanied minor.
298. In both cases discussed previously, the child was represented by Federal
Defenders Services of San Diego, Inc., a legal aid organization for the criminal
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V. CONCLUSION
Historical tensions between Border Patrol and unaccompanied chil-
dren at the U.S.–Mexico border foreshadowed the underpinnings of the
very same border policies at the center of legal scrutiny today.  Unaccom-
panied children continue to flee, border patrol agents continue to abuse
and neglect, due process rights are barely respected, government resettle-
ment programs privilege few and harm many, and the criminalization of
childhood arrivals marches ever onward.  Unaccompanied children de-
tained at the border are, whether they realize it or not, in a liminality of
sorts.299  As experienced by the waves of children before them, navigating
the border becomes a rite of passage as children begin to leave behind
their former legal identities and traverse a legally ambiguous zone seeking
legal status in the United States.  Their guardians on this journey are a
Border Patrol with nearly absolute discretion and little oversight, lacking
the resources, capacity, or training to take them along a safe and secure
path.
What happens to these children during this passage is a process of
association and dissociation that reflects the cognitive dissonance of exclu-
sion and humanitarianism shown in modern immigration policy and dis-
course.300  The experience of these children is a forced litmus test,
checking the temperature of the nation struggling again with the fears
provoked by the uncertainty and ambiguity of race and belonging.  The
interventions and choices that will be made at this critical juncture will be
judged by history as normatively progressive or regressive, as the funda-
mental issues remain the same—time after time.  There is an opportunity
here.  With political gridlock stalling both legislative reforms and Presi-
dent Obama’s Truman-esque executive directives, the judiciary has un-
precedented power to serve as the guide for the vision quest of a
portion of their case.  In such cases, litigants are often referred to another pro
bono legal service provider specializing in immigration if their criminal defense
counsel does not have the capacity to handle any related immigration proceedings.
299. See VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUC-
TURE 95 (1969) (stating liminality is primarily social-psychological concept of ex-
isting “betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom,
convention, and ceremonial”).  For an application of liminality to immigration law
concepts, see Jennifer M. Chaco´n, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L. REV.
709 (2015).
300. This phenomenon may be evidence of what pragmatist philosopher Wil-
liam James described as the “Law of Dissociation by Varying Concomitants”:
What is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to
become dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract
contemplation by the mind . . . .  The practical result of it will be to allow
the mind which has thus dissociated and abstracted a character to analyze
it out of a total, whenever it meets with it again.
1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 506 (rev. ed. 1950); see also Kit
Johnson, Theories of Immigration Law, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1211, 1213 (2014) (identify-
ing “four theories of immigration law” that reflect dissonance in text of Immigra-
tion Code: “(1) individual rights, (2) domestic interest, (3) national values, and
(4) global warfare”).
63
Rogerson: The Politics of Fear: Unaccompanied Immigrant Children and the Ca
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
906 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 843
nation.301  By identifying and staking out the minimum legal standards for
the treatment of unaccompanied children and opening avenues for court
intervention when those standards are breached, the judiciary has begun
the process of restoring human rights and dignity at the Border.  But cases
are pending in which the courts could bend the arc of transformative pub-
lic law litigation even closer to justice; the question remains whether they
will seize this historic opportunity.
301. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying govern-
ment’s motion to stay preliminary injunction entered by U.S. District Court for
Southern District of Texas); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQC4-JFW2];
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, et al. (June 15,
2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWM5-
TB3L]; Robert Barnes & Juliet Eilperin, Supreme Court to Review Obama’s Power on
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